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I. INTRODUCTION
Few contemporary issues concern state and local policymakers as
intensely as unfunded mandates.' Mayors, county executives, city coun-
cilmen, and the professional associations representing them routinely
argue that the federal and state governments have, in recent years, im-
posed at an accelerating rate expensive requirements on municipalities
without granting corresponding funds for compliance, thereby irrespon-
sibly straining the fiscal capacity of municipalities, hampering their
ability to provide essential services, and improperly infringing upon the
scope of local control. The complaints of municipal policymakers have
provoked a variety of proposals for restraining unfunded mandates: ob-
ligatory disclosure of the projected costs of proposed mandates, require-
ments of legislative supermajorities for unfunded mandates, and
statutory and constitutional reimbursement arrangements for state-
imposed obligations on local governments.
In debate about unfunded mandates, governors and state legisla-
tors typically advance a more awkward position, denying that they im-
properly impose unfunded obligations on localities while decrying the
tendency of the federal government to inflict unfinanced responsibilities
on the states. President Bush, in his 1992 State of the Union address,
also granted .important recognition to the anti-mandate cause when he
identified strongly with its concerns.2
Despite their importance to state and local policymakers, unfunded
mandates have received little sustained attention from public finance
and municipal government scholars. This Article is an effort at redress,
an exploration of the tendency of federal and state officials to impose
unfinanced obligations on lower levels of government despite the near
universal condemnation of this practice. The Article concludes that the
unfunded mandate phenomenon is structural in its origins, understand-
able in public choice terms as a form of hidden taxation imposed by
poorly monitored, opportunistic legislators. Accordingly, the Article
concludes that unfinanced mandates require a constitutional response
1. Both for ease of exposition and conformance to common usage, this Article uses the stan-
dard term "unfunded mandates" to refer to legislative mandates and, by extension, administrative
mandates. Court orders raise different considerations and are therefore outside the scope of this
Article's discussion.
2. See Ellen Perlman, Bush's Budget: Beginning Bargaining Tool, 9 City & State 23, 23
(Feb. 10, 1992).
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rather than the palliative remedies generally advanced by the anti-
mandate school.
Part II of this Article provides an introduction to unfunded man-
dates. This Part describes the unfunded mandate phenomenon in its
current form, discusses the prevailing critique of unfunded mandates
and the definitional questions in this area, and outlines the remedies
developed in response to the perceived problem of unfunded mandates.
These remedies generally treat unfunded mandates as glitches in the
legislative process that are correctable through relatively minor,
mechanical reforms.
Part III uses notions of public choice and agency to develop the
Article's principal model. This model depicts unfunded mandates as the
products of self-seeking, poorly monitored state legislators who act
within a zone of discretion and opportunistically accommodate interest
groups incapable of mustering majority support for their demands.
Starting initially with a simple voting paradigm at the local level, the
Article successively elaborates it until it generates unfunded mandates
which, under the model's public choice and agency assumptions, enable
state legislators, inadequately observed by the anti-service public, to
provide discretionary governmental largesse to minority constituencies
without alerting the majority to the deal it is financing through its mu-
nicipal taxes. These pro-service interest groups, unable to obtain the
majority's backing for more attractive political outcomes, such as state
provision of the services they desire or fully financed mandates, accept
unfunded mandates and the hidden taxation such mandates entail as
the best results these groups can achieve given their relatively weak po-
litical positions.
Part IV develops a contrasting model that places a benign gloss on
states' imposition of unfinanced obligations on localities. This contrast-
ing model suggests that public-regarding state policymakers, when con-
fronting externality-generating governmental activities, multiple
jurisdictions, and collective action problems, maximize the welfare of
local taxpayers through a network of reciprocal mandates. In this world,
the anti-mandate complaints of municipal officials reflect either short-
sightedness or the desire to freeload on the public services of surround-
ing jurisdictions.
Part V of this Article revisits the remedies conventionally proposed
to constrain unfunded mandates and concludes that those remedies are
generally inadequate for the perceived problem, at best abating the
adoption of unfunded mandates at the margin. Under public choice
3. While this Article develops its models in terms of state legislative behavior, these models
are readily generalized to governors, regulators, and federal officials.
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premises, the standard anti-mandate recommendations are largely defi-
cient because they do not constrain decisionmakers' discretion and op-
portunistic conduct, the underlying causes of the mandate problem. In
a public choice world, better disclosure does not inhibit legislators from
inflicting unfinanced burdens on lower levels of government. The prob-
lem is not that mandate-imposing legislators are poorly informed but
that they are poorly monitored. Similarly, the factors which permit po-
litical interests to obtain unfunded mandates for themselves-also enable
them, individually or in concert with one another, to surmount
supermajority requirements and statutory reimbursement rules
designed to discourage such mandates. In a public choice world, un-
funded mandates can be checked only through a constitutional right of
reimbursement which, in its strongest variant, would take the form of
prospective nullification, that is, bestowing on lower levels of govern-
ment (for example, municipalities) the constitutional right to ignore
prospectively obligations imposed by higher tiers-of government (for ex-
ample, states) unless the lower levels are fully compensated ab initio for
all costs. Paradoxically, the program of the anti-mandate school is gen-
erally more consistent with the benign, public interest model of un-
funded mandates.
The last portion of this Article summarizes its conclusions. The Ar-
ticle concludes that the public choice model explains unfinanced man-
dates more accurately than the public interest model. At the state level,
the public choice model supports constitutional reform, both by amend-
ment and by judicial interpretation, to protect against unfunded man-
dates and the hidden taxation they entail. Federally, this Article
recommends a revised Tenth Amendment doctrine in the spirit of Na-
tional League of Cities v. Usery,4 protecting constitutionally states and
their subdivisions from federal laws that single them out for un-
reimbursed responsibilities. The Supreme Court's recent decision in
New York v. United States5 may presage movement of the Court's
Tenth Amendment doctrine in this direction.
In short, opponents of unfunded mandates have essentially framed
their indictment in technical terms and cast unfunded mandates as the
result of remediable glitches in the legislative process. However, this
Article suggests that unfunded mandates raise basic structural issues
about the motivations and discretion of political actors, the ability of
voters to monitor officials' performance, and the proper constitutional
relationship between higher and lower tiers of government and between
4. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S.
528 (1985).
5. 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992).
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legislatures and courts. The anti-mandate movement thus returns us to
fundamental and historical controversies about the nature of govern-
ments, and those who populate them, and about the temptations of tax-
ation without accountability.
II. UNFUNDED MANDATES: BACKGROUND
Historically, unfunded mandates can be traced at least as far back
as the time of Tocqueville who, in his 1835 discussion of New England
townships, described the tendency of states to impose responsibilities
on local governments rather than execute such responsibilities them-
selves.' Indeed, much of the traditional legal framework supporting mu-
nicipal governments might be characterized as mandates in the sense
that state law has historically imposed on localities fundamental re-
quirements concerning internal organization and baseline services, such
as state statutes that require localities to establish school boards and
public schools.7 The traditional home rule crusade, emphasizing the vir-
tues of local autonomy and freedom from state interference, can be
viewed as the original anti-mandate movement.8
Contemporary concern with unfunded mandates stems from the
perception that, starting in the early 1970s, the state and federal gov-
ernments began imposing unfinanced obligations on lower tiers of gov-
ernment both quantitatively and qualitatively more onerous than
before. Of these new mandates, those regulating the terms and condi-
tions of employment of local government workforces cause the greatest
concern to muncipal policymakers. Such policymakers routinely con-
tend that arbitration, tenure, pension, and disability statutes inflate the
wages and benefits paid to municipal employees and impede efficient
management of municipal operations.'
Another salient category of the new mandates is the increased re-
distributive activity imposed on localities by unfinanced state man-
dates. In New York, for example, "burdensome state mandates on
6. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 30-31 (Encycl. Brit., 2d ed. 1990).
7. See, for example, Gen. Stat. Conn. §§ 9-203 to 9-206 (1988) (prescribing the structure of
local boards of education); Gen. Stat. Conn. § 10-4a (prescribing minimum educational standards
for public schools).
8. For an introduction to the home rule movement, see Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part
I-The Structure of Local Government Law, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 10 (1990).
9. * See generally Paul G. Barr, Mandates Cost Florida Funds, 21 Pensions and Investments
10 (May 17, 1993); Arbitration Reforms Are Meaningful, 20 Connecticut Town & City 1 (May-
June 1992); Municipal, School Leaders Seek Mandate Reform, 20 Connecticut Town & City 1
(Jan.-Feb. 1992); Connecticut Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, State Man-




Medicaid" are frequently blamed for municipal fiscal distress.10 Simi-
larly, in California, county officials have criticized the state for con-
tracting the scope of the Medicaid program. These officials contend
that under state law this contraction has obliged counties to provide
increased care for the medically indigent.1" State officials, in turn, often
decry federal Medicaid mandates as unfair and unduly burdensome.1 2
Other frequently criticized mandates target narrower constituen-
cies, such as state-imposed provision by localities of busing to private
school students and other special education services.13 Unfunded envi-
ronmental mandates enacted by federal and state officials have also be-
come of increasing concern.14 In response to these unfinanced
obligations imposed by higher tiers of government, a consistent refrain
emerges from lower level officials who view themselves constrained,
Gulliver-like, to levy taxes and deliver services to discharge these obli-
gations: If these mandated undertakings are so important, pay for them
yourself.
The most striking statement of the anti-mandate perspective oc-
curred in the unprecedented and unsuccessful effort of Bridgeport,
Connecticut to invoke the protection of Chapter 9 of the federal Bank-
ruptcy Code.' 5 Bridgeport's insolvency, it was asserted, stemmed in sig-
nificant measure from state-imposed unfunded mandates that made it
impossible for municipal officials to conduct the city's affairs in an effi-
cient and effective manner. 6 The Connecticut Conference of Munici-
palities, the lobbying association of Connecticut's localities, told the
federal bankruptcy court:
10. Gary Enos, Virus of Fiscal Distress Spreads to Cities, 9 City & State 1, 1 (Aug. 10, 1992).
11. See Kinlaw v. State, 54 Cal. 3d 326, 814 P.2d 1308 (1991).
12. See, for example, Steven D. Gold, Changes in State and Local Tax Systems Over the
Past 20 Years, 57 Tax Notes 893, 899-900 (1992).
13. See, for example, Town of Lexington v. Comm'r of Educ., 393 Mass. 693, 473 N.E.2d 673
(1985).
14. Frank J. Sturzl, A Necessary Heresy: How Environmental Programs Threaten to Bank-
rupt Cities and How Common Sense Became Heresy; The Tyranny of Environmental Mandates;
The Public's View of Mandates; The Power (and the Cost) of Public Perception; TML Survey:
Cities Struggle to Keep Up with Environmental Costs (unpublished manuscripts prepared for
Texas Municipal League, on file with author).
15. Bridgeport was the largest municipality of general jurisdiction ever to file under Chapter
9. The two critical opinions of the bankruptcy court are In re City of Bridgeport, 128 Bankr. 688
(Bankr. D. Conn. 1991), and In re City of Bridgeport, 129 Bankr. 332 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991). See
also David L. Dubrow, Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Viable Option for Municipalities in
Fiscal Crisis?, 24 Urban Law. 539, 539 (1992) (characterizing the Bridgeport bankruptcy filing as
"a critical juncture in municipal finance history" which "sent shock waves throughout the financial
community.... Bridgeport, with a population of 140,000, is the largest city to ever have attempted
to utilize Chapter 9 to restructure its debt.").
16. See Memorandum of Law of the Connecticut Conference of Municipalities in Support of
the City of Bridgeport's Authority to File a Chapter 9 Petition at 1.5-1.7, In re City of Bridgeport,
128 Bankr. 688 (Bankr. D. Conn. 199) (No. 91-51519).
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Bridgeport has been driven into its current need for Chapter 9 protection by
circumstances largely beyond its control... [including] mandates imposed by the
State on municipalities without adequate funding. Indeed, 82 percent of the more
than 250 statutory state mandates are totally unfunded. For example, in 1989-1990
alone, Bridgeport paid $1.7 million in state mandated yet unfunded heart and hy-
pertension benefits for police and fire personnel.
17
Bridgeport's current state of financial distress was largely induced by the
State."
Although these sentiments constitute a particularly forceful indict-
ment of unfunded mandates, they are typical of the views expressed by
municipal officials19 and their professional associations, ° as well as a
substantial body of editorial opinion that denounces the fiscal impact of
17. Id. at 1.5, 1.7.
18. Supplemental Memorandum of Law of the Connecticut Conference of Municipalities in
Support of the City of Bridgeport's Authority to File a Chapter 9 Petition at 8, In re City of
Bridgeport, 128 Bankr. 688 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991) (No. 91-51519).
19. See generally Pay Cities to Enforce Fed Mandates: Pol, N.Y. Post 14 (June 21, 1993);
Ellen Perlman, Is There Really Mandate Relief on the Horizon?, 10 City & State 3 (June 7, 1993);
Stephen Goldsmith, Bureaucracy Shackles the Urban Poor, Wall St. J. A14 (June 10, 1992); Frank
B. Connolly, Towns Whipsawed by Unfair Mandate, New Haven Reg. 14 (Apr. 15, 1992); The
Time for Action in Our Cities Is Now, 9 City & State 4 (July 13, 1992); Johanne A. Presser,
Frustrations on the Board, Newsweek 11 (Sept. 14, 1992). See also Ronald Berkman, et al., eds., In
the National Interest: The 1990 Urban Summit 13, 25 (Twentieth Cent. Fund, 1992) (recom-
mending that muncipal officials "seek passage of state and federal laws that will bar any future
unfunded mandates applying to local governments;" and noting comments of Mayor Gerald Mc-
Gann of Jersey City, New Jersey: "One of the big problems with Washington and my own state
government is the programs that they mandate. They tell us that they want us to perform certain
functions, certain services, and then they never clearly give us the money to provide those activi-
ties."); William A. Collins, School Board Fed Up with State Mandates, New Haven Reg. 11 (Nov.
13, 1992); Alaska Task Force on Governmental Roles, Final Report 9, 19 (July 10, 1992) (stating
that "there is no doubt that the cost of complying with state and federal mandates is consuming
an ever-increasing portion of municipal funds.... As in the rest of the country, mandates are of
increasing concern to local officials in Alaska.").
20. See, for example, Charles J. Pasqua, A Major Victory., 56 La. Mun. Rev. 3, 3 (Nov. 1991)
(describing Louisiana localities as "long over-burdened by the weight of unfunded state mandates
which dominated budgetary decisions and made it difficult for elected officials to devote local tax
dollars to local priorities and needs"); Arkansas Municipal League, Policies and Goals of the Ar-
kansas Municipal League 4 (June 26, 1992) (noting that "[tihe cost of complying with these man-
dates severely strains municipal budgets to the extent of forcing them to reduce or cut local
priorities"); Joe Klein, Cities, Heal Thyselves, Newsweek 24, 24 (July 5, 1993) (noting that the
nation's mayors are "asking for less burdensome governance-for relief from costly federal require-
ments, fewer 'unfunded mandates' like clean-air regulations. 'The fiscal crisis in the cities,' said
their new president, Jerry Abramson of Louisville, 'is largely a result of unfunded federal man-
dates'."); Dan Miller, Mandates Spoil a Honeymoon, 10 City & State 6, 6 (July 19, 1993) (stating
that "[m]andates that force state and local governments to provide the services that the federal
government doesn't want to pay for have been eating away at local budgets for years .. ."); Ellen
Perlman, Mayors Face a Big Sell, 10 City & State 4, 4 (July 5, 1993) (stating that "mayors plan to
try to educate residents on what they say is the damage unfunded federal and state mandates do
to city budgets and services").
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unfunded mandates and the corresponding diminution of local
control:
21
We've said it many times before, but evidently it needs repeating. States and cities
cannot afford to pay for programs they do not initiate, perhaps may not even sup-
port. They cannot afford more federal mandates without federal funding behind
them. Frankly, they cannot be the ones to shoulder all the burdens of
government.
22
The prevailing anti-mandate rhetoric is nearly universal in charac-
ter, bipartisan in nature, and embraced by officials from suburban and
rural areas23 as well as big city policymakers 24 and governors.2 5 As for-
mer President Bush recognized:
21. See, for example, Quit Feeding the Flab, Wall St. J. A6 (Aug. 26, 1992) (claiming that
much state and local spending "is to attend to mandates from the next level up"); State Should
Fund or Lift Mandates, New Haven Reg. B2 (Mar. 15, 1992); Dan Miller, How to Boost Local
Fortunes, 9 City & State 6, 6 (Sept. 7, 1992) (suggesting an "[i]mmediate[ ] freeze [on] unfunded
federal mandates"); Pennsylvania League of Cities, Pennsylvania State of the Cities Report 20
(Mar. 1992) (noting that "[l]ocal autonomy and control continues to be threatened by mandates");
Gold, 57 Tax Notes at 899-900 (cited in note 12) (stating that "Medicaid illustrates the problem of
unfunded mandates, another important mechanism through which the federal government has af-
fected state finances.... Unfunded mandates also have increased state and local costs in other
areas, such as environmental programs.... [L]ocal revenue systems ... have been strained by
federal and state mandates .. "); Legislature Disobeying Own Law on Funding Legislative Man-
dates, Fla. Times-Union 1 (Feb. 20, 1989); Oct. 27: A Red-Letter Day, 10 City & State 6, 6 (Aug.
16, 1993) (stating that "we must applaud a sea change in the way mayors and county leaders are
attacking the confining bonds of unfunded federal mandates"). See also Asphalt Bungle, Wall St.
J. A16 (Sept. 7, 1993) (stating that "Congress has its hands full trying to contain the runaway
programs it has already created without stearnrolling the states with more burdens"); ICMA,
NACo and NLC Join in Mandate Protest, 10 City & State 6, 6 (Sept. 13, 1993) (noting that
"unfunded mandates are overwhelming local government budgets whether they are for a good pur-
pose or not").
22. On Unfunded Mandates, 9 City & State 6, 6 (Feb. 24, 1992).
23. See R. E. Teeter, Strong Cities Make a Strong Nation, Teeter Says, Ark. City & Town
12, 12 (July 1992) (arguing that "state and federal governments pass new regulations and man-
dates that have increased our cost of operation, but at the same time reduce their financial support
for the cities").
24. See generally Rodd Zolkos, Republican Mayors, Governors to Oppose Unfunded Man-
dates, 9 City & State 4 (Aug. 10, 1992); Ellen Perlman, Spotlight on Urban Woes, 9 City & State 1
(Apr. 6, 1992); J. Andrew Hoerner, States' Fiscal Problems Worsening; Unfunded Federal Man-
dates Cited, 56 Tax Notes 547 (1992); Edward I. Koch, The Mandate Millstone, 61 Pub. Interest
42 (1980).
25. See L. Douglas Wilder, Commentary, 9 City & State 10, 10 (Sept. 21, 1992) (explaining
that "[o]ver the past 10 years, the burdens of government have shifted substantially from the
federal government to cities and states-the result of federal budgets that mandate more and more
programs to be implemented by state and local governments.. ."). See also Shaky State Finances
Blamed on Federal Government, 5 Amer. Banker-Bond Buyer 12, 12 (Aug. 26, 1991) (quoting
Maine Rep. John Martin, Democrat-Eagle Lake, president of the National Conference of State
Legislatures as stating that "[t]he shaky finances of most states are due mainly to the 'tidal wave
of unfunded mandates, restrictions on revenues and preemptions sent to us by the federal govern-
ment' "); Paul R. Blackley and Larry DeBoer, Explaining State Government Discretionary Reve-
nue Increases in Fiscal Years 1991 and 1992, 46 Nat'l Tax J. 1, 1 (1993) (revealing that "[s]tates
have long complained about unfunded federal mandates... ").
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[U]nfinanced federal government mandates ... are the requirements Congress puts
on our cities, counties and states without supplying the money. And if Congress
passed a mandate, it should be forced to pay for it and to balance the cost with
savings elsewhere. After all, a mandate just increases someone else's burden.28
Notwithstanding the broad anti-mandate consensus among policy-
makers and their spokesmen, neither the public finance literature" nor
the municipal government literature28 develops a systematic analysis of
the contemporary mandate phenomenon.2 9 Of the leading public fi-
nance texts, Professor Joseph E. Stiglitz's most explicitly acknowledges
the existence and critique of unfunded mandates:
In some cases the federal government has mandated that the state and local gov-
ernments provide certain services (for instance, access facilities for the handi-
capped) without providing the requisite funds. The states and local communities
have, not surprisingly, complained, arguing that if the federal government attaches
such importance to these services, it should also finance them.
30
Professor Stiglitz, however, does not discuss municipal officials' criti-
cisms of state-imposed mandates, nor does he develop an explanation
for the persistence and growth of mandates despite their near universal
condemnation. Similarly, Professor Harvey S. Rosen, in his chapter on
state-local finance, alludes to the "numerous federal regulations" im-
posed on localities and suggests that these "regulations ...may im-
prove welfare ... [although] some believe that the system of federal
26. Perlman, 9 City & State at 23 (cited in note 2) (quoting former President George Bush's
1992 State of the Union Address). For one listing of federal mandates, see Robert McCurley, Jr.,
Federally Mandated State Legislation 4-46 (Nat'l Conf. of State Legis., 1990).
27. For example, Joseph Pechman, in his discussion of the fiscal plight of the cities, attrib-
utes their financial distress to shrinking tax bases, unresponsive legislatures controlled by rural
and suburban interests, and the cities' own profligacy. His analysis of the fiscal relationships
among cities, states, and the federal government disregards the perceived problem of unfunded
mandates. Joseph A. Pechman, Federal Tax Policy 285-98 (Brookings Inst., 5th ed. 1987). Simi-
larly, Professors Richard and Peggy Musgrave, in their leading text on public finance, discuss nu-
merous state and local government issues including differences among jurisdictions in taxing
capacity and need, grants-in-aid to states and localities, and school finance reform, but not un-
funded mandates. Richard A. Musgrave and Peggy B. Musgrave, Public Finance in Theory and
Practice 523-63 (McGraw-Hill, 4th ed. 1984). Likewise, Professors Edgar and Jacquelene Brown-
ing, in their survey of "special topics in state-local public finance," identify such issues as tax
competition among states and municipalities and tax exporting by local jurisdictions; however,
they do not discuss the tendency of higher levels of government to impose obligations on lower
levels without providing the resources for compliance. Edgar K. Browning and Jacquelene M.
Browning, Public Finance and the Price System 481-87 (MacMillan, 3d ed. 1987).
28. See, for example, Jefferson B. Fordham, Local Government Law (Foundation, 2d ed.
1986).
29. The dearth of academic writings on mandates contrasts sharply with the voluminous
scholarly literature on grants-in-aid. See, for example, Rosella Levaggi, Fiscal Federalism and
Grants-in-Aid: The Problem of Asymmetric Information (Grower, 1991); Lawrence D. Brown,
James W. Fossett, and Kenneth T. Palmer, The Changing Politics of Federal Grants (Brookings
Inst., 1984).
30. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Economics of the Public Sector 550 (W.W. Norton, 1986).
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regulation over subfederal governmental units has become so compli-
cated that it may be difficult to determine which level of government
has responsibility for what."' Professor Rosen, however, does not ex-
plore either the forces animating such regulation or the tendency of
states to impose unfinanced obligations on localities.
Alice Rivlin advances a decidedly negative picture of federal man-
dates. Contending that mandates blur responsibilities among different
levels of government and thus reduce accountability to the electorate,
she attributes the mandate phenomenon to the constraints of the fed-
eral fisc:
The federal government's own fiscal weakness has not made it any less eager to tell
states and localities what to do. Indeed, when its ability to make grants declined,
the federal government turned increasingly to mandates as a means of controlling
state and local activity without having to pay the bill.3s
As an explanation for the proliferation of unfunded mandates, the
plight of the federal (and, by extension, the states') treasury is plausible
as far as it goes. However, such an explanation leaves unanswered a
host of important questions: Why should a higher level of government
respond to its fiscal distress by imposing unfinanced obligations on
lower levels rather than by increasing its own revenue? Which public
activities will upper tiers of government fund from their own resources
and which will be consigned to unfunded mandates? Why are public
officials burdened by mandates unable to resist their adoption in the
halls of Congress and the statehouse?
The definitional scope of the mandate phenomenon is by no means
self-evident; indeed, as we shall see,33 two definitional issues are central
to an interpretation of this phenomenon.' The first of these is whether
31. Harvey S. Rosen, Public Finance 512-13 (Irwin, 2d ed. 1988).
32. Alice M. Rivlin, Reviving the American Dream: The Economy, the States and the Fed-
eral Government 107 (Brookings Inst., 1992). Ms. Rivlin's analysis has been echoed by other com-
mentators who characterize the growth of unfunded mandates as a response to fiscal constraint
coupled with a desire for activist government. See, for example, David Osborne and Ted Gaebler,
Reinventing Government 276, 277 (Addison-Wesley, 1992) (stating that "as the federal deficit wid-
ened, Congress increasingly turned to mandates . . . [now] local leaders increasingly complain
about overregulation from state government"); David R. Beam, On the Origins of the Mandate
Issue, in Michael Fix and Daphne A. Kenyon, eds., Coping with Mandates: What Are the Alterna-
tives?, 23, 29-30 (Urban Inst., 1990) (commenting that "[t]he record of recent decades suggests that
federal policymakers are inclined to turn to mandates at times when fiscal resources are scarce..
33. See text accompanying notes 130-36.
34. While the definitional issues discussed in the text are central to an interpretation of the
mandate issue, two lesser definitional questions also deserve mention. The first is whether the
mandate concept should encompass only statutory requirements or whether the concept should
also include administratively imposed rules. Most state mandate statutes take the broader ap-
proach, defining mandates to include "executive action" or state-promulgated regulations as well
as statutory measures impacting on local governments. See, for example, Illinois State Mandates
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laws of general applicability ought to be classified as mandates when
they apply to lower levels of government.3 5 Consider, for example, work-
ers' compensation laws that impose the same obligations upon munici-
palities as apply to private employers. Some observers classify such
laws as mandates because they result in higher costs for local govern-
ments. 6 The California Supreme Court came to a contrary conclusion
in County of Los Angeles v. State,3 7 holding that state legislation which
increases localities' worker compensation contributions are not man-
dates for the purposes of the California mandate reimbursement
scheme because similar contributions also are required of private em-
ployers.3 8 "[L]aws that apply generally to all state residents and enti-
ties," the court ruled, do not fall within California's constitutional
definition of a mandate, a "new program or higher level of service" im-
posed by the state on localities.3 9 That definition, the court held, does
not encompass "[laws of general application" but is limited to "func-
tions peculiar to government, programs that carry out the governmental
function of providing services to the public, or laws which, to imple-
ment a state policy, impose unique requirements on local governments
and do not apply generally to all residents and entities in the state.
'40
Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 85, § 2203(b) (1991); Gen. Stat. Conn. § 2-32b(a)(2) (1988); Mass. Gen.
Laws Ann. ch. 29, § 27C(c) (West, 1992). On the other hand, the State and Local Government
Cost Estimate Act of 1981 defines mandates in more limited terms, requiring the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) to project only the impact of proposed federal legislation on states and mu-
nicipalities. 2 U.S.C. § 653(c) (1988).
Another definitional issue is whether the mandate notion should be tempered by a de minimis
rule. Iowa's mandate law, for example, exempts from its coverage any "statutory requirement"
generating less than $100,000 in costs annually and less than $500,000 in costs over five years. Iowa
Code § 25B.3(2) (1992). Similarly, the Illinois State Mandates Act excludes from its reimburse-
ment arrangement any mandate imposing less than $1000 in annual costs on any local government
or less than $50,000 yearly on all local governments. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 85, § 2208(a)(5). Likewise,
the State and Local Government Cost Estimate Act applies only if a proposed bill will impose
expenses on cities and states in excess of $200,000,000 "or is likely to have exceptional fiscal conse-
quences for a geographic region or a particular level of government." 2 U.S.C. § 653(c). In contrast,
other state laws more broadly define as a mandate "any" law or regulation imposing costs on local
governments. See, for example, Gen. Stat. Conn. § 2-32b(a)(2).
35. The Article concludes that the public choice analysis of unfunded mandates is more con-
sistent with the narrower definition of mandates, excluding laws of general applicability. See text
accompanying note 131.
36. See Connecticut Conference of Municipalities, CCM Report: State Mandates on Cities
and Towns 31 (Jan. 1991).
37. 43 Cal. 3d 46, 729 P.2d 202 (1987).
38. Id. at 209.
39. Id. at 208.
40. Id. See also City of Sacramento v. State, 50 Cal. 3d 51, 785 P.2d 522, 530-31 (1990)
(applying County of Los Angeles to hold that the extension of state unemployment insurance cov-
erage to municipal workers is not a reimbursable mandate requiring a new program or higher ser-
vice level, but is a nonreimbursable cost stemming from a law of general application).
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A second important definitional issue is whether a mandate ought
to be considered funded if the higher level of government imposing the
obligation does not itself levy a tax to finance the mandate, but instead
authorizes the lower tier to levy new taxes to offset mandated costs. 41
The Florida Constitution, for example, treats a state-enacted mandate
as funded if the legislature grants the affected localities a new "funding
source" which the localities can use to pay for the mandate. 42 The anti-
mandate provision of the Louisiana Constitution is similar.43 In con-
trast, the Michigan Constitution characterizes state-imposed obligations
as unfinanced unless there is a "state appropriation ... disbursed" to
the municipalities to reimburse them, thus placing the direct onus upon
the state and its officials to levy the taxes to pay for mandates. 44 Massa-
chusetts law similarly characterizes a mandate as unfunded unless the
state itself "by appropriation ... assum[es]" the localities' costs from
the mandate.45
Despite these definitional questions, there is general agreement at
the core of the concept: A mandate is a requirement imposed on a
subordinate level of government to provide a public service that other-
wise would not be furnished or to provide a public service in a more
costly fashion. A mandate is unfunded if the higher tier of government
fails to reimburse fully the lower level for the costs imposed on it.46
Most states and the federal government currently require, as part
of their legislative processes, the preparation of cost estimates for pro-
posed mandates. Such estimates, usually labelled "fiscal notes," gener-
41. The Article concludes that a mandate should be considered unfunded when the higher
level of government couples the mandate with a new tax that the lower tier of government must
levy. In such a situation, the higher level policymakers gain political credit with the group benefit-
ting from the mandate, but force lower level policymakers to pay the political costs of levying the
new tax to fund the mandate. See text accompanying notes 122-58.
42. Fla. Const. Art. VII, § 18(a). For background on this provision, see generally Kristin
Conroy Rubin, Comment, Unfunded Mandates: A Continuing Source of Intergovernmental Dis-
cord, 17 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 591 (1990).
43. The Louisiana Constitution of 1974 excuses localities from complying with mandates un-
less, inter alia, the state provides "a local source of revenue" and "the affected political subdivision
is authorized by ordinance or resolution to levy and collect such revenue." La. Const., Art. VI,
§ 14(a). Under one interpretation, this language would permit localities to decline a proffered reve-
nue source and thus resist the accompanying mandate. An alternative understanding of this lan-
guage compels the locality to accept the taxing authority and to implement the local "ordinance or
resolution." Id.
44. See Mich. Const., Art. IX, § 29.
45. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 29, § 27C(c) (cited in note 34). For background on the Massa-
chusetts reimbursement statute, see Emily D. Lunceford, The Massachusetts Mandate Statute
and Its Application, in Fix and Kenyon, Coping with Mandates at 77 (cited in note 32).
46. See Joseph F. Zimmerman, Relieving the Fiscal Burdens of State and Federal Mandates
and Restraints, 19 Current Mun. Problems 216, 216 (1992).
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ally have been adjudged failures.47 There is widespread agreement that
disclosure of the projected effects of unfunded mandates has, to date,
done little to inhibit their adoption.4 The General Accounting Office
(GAO), for example, concluded that the State and Local Government
Cost Estimate Act of 1981,49 which requires the Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) to project the costs of proposed mandates on states and
localities, rarely has deterred Congress from imposing such mandates.
5 0
The failure of disclosure to constrain the proliferation of unfunded
mandates has led to the development of alternative remedies, in partic-
ular, reimbursement requirements and supermajority rules. The pioneer
of mandate reimbursement schemes is Article XIIIB of the California
Constitution, which codifies earlier statutes on the subject and gener-
ally requires the legislature to fund any new obligation that it imposes
on localities.5 1 A statutorily established Commission on State Mandates
adjudicates localities' claims for compensation, subject to judicial re-
view.52 The constitutions of other states, such as Michigan and Tennes-
see,53 similarly prohibit the legislature from imposing new mandates
unless financing is provided. Other states' reimbursement regimes are
created by statute. In this vein, members of Congress have proposed
statutory protection for states and cities from federal mandates. For
47. The public choice model of unfunded mandates suggests that fiscal notes fail to deter the
adoption of such mandates since the legislators who impose them already understand what they
are doing. See discussion in Part V.B.
48. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Mandates: Cases in State-Local
Relations, M-173 at 14 (Sept. 1990) (stating that "[m]ost states that have a fiscal note statute
report that the practice rarely accomplishes the intent of the statute"); General Accounting Office,
Legislative Mandates: State Experiences Offer Insights for Federal Action, GAO-HRD-88-75 at
13 (Sept. 1988) (explaining that "generally the [cost] estimates [of mandates] have not altered the
course of legislation.. ."); Alaska Task Force, Final Report at 19 (cited in note 19) (reporting that
"[i]n practice, reimbursement bills and fiscal notes have proven to be relatively easy to circum-
vent"); South Carolina Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, State Mandated
Local Government Expenditures and Revenue Limitations in South Carolina 63, 70 (June 1988)
(claiming that "most of the mandates were passed [by the South Carolina legislature] without the
fiscal notes required by law.... USC's Bureau of Research and Service reported widespread non-
compliance and inappropriate compliance with the existing [South Carolina] fiscal note bill.");
Janet M. Kelly, State Mandates v, vii (Nat'l League of Cities, 1992).
49. 2 U.S.C. § 653 (cited in note 34).
50. General Accounting Office, Legislative Mandates at 9, 17 (cited in note 48). See Theresa
A. Gullo, Estimating the Impact of Federal Legislation on State and Local Governments, in Fix
and Kenyon, Coping with Mandates at 41, 47 (cited in note 32); Ann Calvaresi Barr, Cost Estima-
tion as an Anti-Mandate Strategy, in Fix and Kenyon, Coping with Mandates at 49, 51.
51. Cal. Const. Art. XIIIB, § 6.
52. Cal. Gov. Code § 17525-17559 (West, 1993).
53. See Tenn. Const., Art. II, § 24 (providing that "[n]o law of general application shall
impose increased expenditure requirements on cities or counties unless the General Assembly
shall provide that the state share in the cost"); Mich. Const., Art. IX, § 29 (stating that "[a] new
activity or service ... shall not be required by the legislature ... unless a state appropriation is
made . . .").
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example, HR 2338, proposed by Representative Snowe, by act of Con-
gress would release state and local governments from compliance with
newly enacted federal laws "unless all expenses ... are fully funded by
the United States."
54
Observers, including the GAO, suggest that the efficacy of state re-
imbursement regimes has been mixed at best.55 Constitutionally based
reimbursement schemes have been somewhat more successful in re-
stricting the adoption of unfunded mandates. Nevertheless, in the face
of such schemes, legislators frequently impose unfinanced mandates
anyway, provide reimbursement on a delayed basis, or deliberately
underfund payments to localities, thereby forcing municipal officials to
sue to uphold their constitutional protection against unfinanced man-
dates. Statutory reimbursement rules have been even less successful in
curbing new mandates, because legislatures often vote to suspend such
rules. The Illinois legislature, for example, has voted repeatedly to sus-
pend its reimbursement obligation under the Illinois State Mandates
Act s.5 Florida's experience with statutory reimbursement was similar.57
As an alternative approach, some states have enacted
supermajority requirements for unfunded mandates. The Florida and
Louisiana state constitutions, for example, generally require a two-
thirds majority in both houses of the legislature to impose an unfunded
mandate.58 Less stringently, Connecticut's mandate statute required the
54. HR 2338, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. at 1 (May 14, 1991). See S 2170, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. at 6
(Jan. 30, 1992) (proposing that Congress declare that localities should be given extended deadlines
or federal funds for compliance with federal mandates).
55. General Accounting Office, Legislative Mandates at 40 (cited in note 48). See also Alaska
Task Force, Final Report at 19 (cited in note 19) (stating that "[i]n practice, reimbursement bills
and fiscal notes have proven to be relatively easy to circumvent"); Richard H. Horte, State Exper-
iences with Mandate Reimbursement, in Fix and Kenyon, Coping with Mandates at 57 (cited in
note 32); Kelly, State Mandates at 77 (cited in note 48) (explaining that "[s]tate legislatures are
extremely resourceful in circumventing mandate barriers").
56. General Accounting Office, Legislative Mandates at 39 (cited in note 48). See also Fi-
nance Department, City of Champaign, Mandates and Other Legislation Affecting Fiscal Matters
1 (June 16, 1992) (explaining that "[u]nfortunately every time a law imposing a mandate is
adopted, the state also amends the Mandates Act to exempt the payment. In fact, the state has
never made a payment to any local government under the Mandates Act."); Daniel Keefe, The
Legislative Evolution of the State Mandates Act 33 (May 14, 1992) (noting "the huge number of
bills which have received exemptions from the Act").
57. See Susan A. MacManus, Enough Is Enough: Floridians' Support for Proposition 3 Lim-
iting State Mandates on Local Government 2 (unpublished manuscript prepared for the 1991
Annual Meeting of the Florida Political Science Association, on file with the Author) (relaying that
in Florida, "the number of unfunded state mandates had escalated significantly throughout the
1980s in spite of the fact that there already was a statutory prohibition against them").
58. Fla. Const., Art. VII, § 18(a); La. Const., Art. VI, § 14(B)(6).
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legislature's appropriations and budget committees to approve new
mandates unless a two-thirds vote suspended review by those panels.
5 9
A common premise shared by all these proposals is that unfunded
mandates are a problem of legislative process, curable through rela-
tively palliative measures. As the Article shall now demonstrate, un-
funded mandates reflect more fundamental causes and require more
fundamental responses.
III. THE PUBLIC CHOICE MODEL OF UNFUNDED MANDATES:
FEDERALISM, AGENCY PROBLEMS, AND INTEREST GROUP ACCOMMODATION
This Article now examines unfunded mandates from a public
choice 0 perspective, the perspective that best explains such mandates.6 ,
This Part starts with a simple voting model that does not generate
mandates and elaborates the model sequentially until it does. In its fi-
nal form, the public choice model explains unfunded mandates as a
problem of federalism, agency, and interest group accommodation, a
means by which poorly monitored, self-seeking legislators use their legal
superiority over local governments and opportunistically exploit a zone
of discretion to satisfy minority constituencies without alerting the ma-
jority to the deals financed through its municipal taxes. These minority
constituencies accept unfunded mandates because they lack majority
support for more desirable, better-financed means of meeting their de-
mands for public services while legislators dispense unfinanced man-
dates to maximize their political support from these constituencies
without the majority comprehending the costs inflicted on it through
higher municipal taxes imposed sub silentio by the state. In a public
59. See Gen. Stat. Conn. § 2-32b(d) (1988) as in effect prior to amendment by Public Act
No. 93-434, 1993 Ct. ALS 434. For background on this provision, see generally Geary Maher, Con-
necticut's Consideration and Rejection of a Mandatory State Reimbursement Program, in Fix
and Kenyon, Coping with Mandates at 93 (cited in note 32).
60. Many current sources can acquaint the reader with public choice theory and its basic
premises: officeholders who entrepreneurially maximize their self-interests by dispensing govern-
mental largesse, rent-seeking interest groups which seek such largesse from the public treasury in
exchange for their political support, a general public disorganized and unable to protect itself
against the bargains struck at its expense by officeholders and interest groups, the capture of pub-
lic bodies by the constituencies most affected by such bodies' jurisdictions. See, for example, Ed-
ward A. Zelinsky, James Madison and Public Choice at Gucci Gulch: A Procedural Defense of
Tax Expenditures and Tax Institutions, 102 Yale L. J. 1165, 1171 (1993). See also generally Rich-
ard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 524 (Little, Brown, 4th ed. 1992); Dennis C. Mueller,
Public Choice II (Cambridge, 1989); Daniel Farber, Symposium on the Theory of Public Choice,
74 Va. L. Rev. 167 (1988).
61. The Article considers an alternative approach to unfunded mandates in Part IV and dis-
cusses the superiority of the public choice explanation of mandates in text accompanying notes
122-34.
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choice world, the vice of unfunded mandates is not that they diminish
local autonomy62 but that they entail hidden taxation.
While this Part formulates the public choice model in terms of
poorly monitored state legislatures imposing hidden taxes on municipal
taxpayers, the model's lessons are readily generalized to governors, fed-
eral officials, and administrative agencies.
To begin construction of this model, initially assume a state of
twenty voters" grouped into four localities: a central city and three
smaller suburban communities. At this preliminary stage, assume fur-
ther that there is a single public service under consideration to be paid
for and provided municipally, that all decisions about public activity
and taxation are made by direct voting and simple majorities at the
local level, that the world is imperfectly Tiebout-like (that is, voters
with similar preferences tend to congregate within the same locality but
cannot isolate themselves perfectly),6 and that the preferences of vot-
ers, by local jurisdiction, are as follows:
62. Although mandates impinge on local autonomy, it can be replied that home rule is a
conditional value which must often yield to more important considerations. After all, state and
federal governments reflect broader concerns that transcend municipal boundaries. Mandates re-
sponding to these broader concerns, the rejoinder continues, properly diminish local control in the
service of these concerns. In contrast, it is hard to imagine anyone openly arguing the normative
propriety of hidden taxation.
63. Some advocates of local expenditures may reside outside the locality and thus not vote.
For example, a policeman may work for the central city, live in a suburb, and seek to improve the
terms and conditions of his employment through local politics. The simplest way of thinking of
such pro-service nonresidents is that they have proxies in the local electorate, such as relatives of
the policeman who live in the city and who, on the policeman's behalf, favor higher police salaries.
As the public choice model develops, the reader will see that these proxies will obtain higher
spending locally if they can. When these proxies cannot, they will attempt to obtain state funding
for their demands and, if they lack a statewide majority for state financing, will accept unfunded
mandates. When the political struggle moves from the locality to the state arena, the pro-service
nonresident becomes a voter in his own right, instead of simply relying on his proxies. For exam-
ple, the policeman can pressure his own state representative from the suburbs to provide state
funding for local police salaries, or, in the alternative, for an unfunded mandate increasing such
salaries.
64. Many factors prevent voters from isolating themselves perfectly according to their prefer-
ences for public services. For ejample, the need to minimize commuting costs causes some individ-
uals to live near their places of employment, even though this entails residing in communities
offering less than optimal service and tax packages. See Stephen David Galowitz, Interstate




Jurisdiction For Service Against Service
Central City 4 6
Suburb A 3 0
Suburb B 3 1
Suburb C 1 2
Statewide Vote 11 9
In this rudimentary world, the story ends with Suburbs A and B
voting for the public service while, in Central City and Suburb C, the
service and correlative tax are rejected by the electorate. 5 Unfunded
mandates do not occur in this simplified setting because, by assump-
tion, public services are determined only locally and there is no higher
level of government to impose unfinanced obligations on municipalities.
To begin elaborating these initial assumptions, postulate that is-
sues can be shifted from the local domain to the state arena where di-
rect voting and simple majorities still control. Under these changed
circumstances, why would a statewide coalition form to support the
public service at the higher level of government? For pro-service voters
who can prevail locally, statewide provision of the service presents an
opportunity to lower their taxes by spreading costs among a larger
group of taxpayers.66 In addition, voters who comprise the majority in
Suburbs A and B might view the public activity as ideologically attrac-
tive or as generating positive externalities and thus favor the activity,
not merely for the particularized benefits they receive, but as a matter
of principle or for the spillovers spawned in other jurisdictions. The
pro-service voters in Central City and Suburb C, minorities within their
respective communities, turn to the statewide arena and coalition with
65. In a frictionless Tiebout world, in which households can change jurisdictions costlessly,
the losers would respond to these electoral outcomes by migrating to the localities corresponding to
their preferences. Thus, the lone voter in Suburb B who opposed the proposed public service and
tax would move either to Central City or to Suburb C, while the voters in those communities
seeking the service rejected by their fellow residents would relocate to Suburbs A and B.
66. Suppose that the voters are debating the public transportation of private school pupils.
Suppose further that each voter favoring such transportation has a single child who would benefit,
that the cost of such transportation is $100 per child, and that the expense of public services is
divided per capita. In Suburb A, the total cost incurred will be $300 (three children at $100 each),
resulting in a tax of $100 per taxpayer ($300 total cost divided equally among three voters). In
Suburb B, the cost also will total $300 (three children at $100 each), resulting in a tax of $75 per
taxpayer ($300 total cost divided over four voters).
If the service can be provided statewide, total costs will be $1100 (11 children at $100 each),
yielding a tax of only $55 per taxpayer ($1100 total cost divided among 20 voters).
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the pro-service voters of Suburbs A and B as their only means of ob-
taining the public activity they desire.
Suppose, for example, that the service in question is government-
provided busing for pupils attending private schools.6 7 Pro-busing vot-
ers in Suburbs A and B will favor statewide provision of such busing to
spread the cost over a larger tax base. Such voters also might support
statewide busing from an ideological affinity with private school fami-
lies in other communities or because of perceived benefits from facili-
tating private school attendance by others' children. Pro-busing voters
in Central City and Suburb C, outvoted at home, will seek busing at the
higher level of government since they cannot obtain it locally.
Under these circumstances, supporters of the public service will de-
mand a statewide vote and, at the higher level of government, prevail
by a vote of eleven to nine. However, the victory of the pro-service ma-
jority would not result in an unfunded mandate imposed on the four
local jurisdictions; more attractive to the victorious coalition is a state
agency to finance and administer the service on a statewide basis.
Under this approach, the pro-service voters of Suburbs A and B would
receive the benefits of statewide cost sharing. These voters would join
the pro-service statewide coalition to spread costs over a broader state-
wide tax base and would behave contrary to their interests if they
merely voted to return matters to the smaller tax bases of their locali-
ties.6 8 Moreover, under the state agency alternative, the pro-service vot-
ers of Central City and Suburb C would receive sympathetic
administration from a bureau that the statewide majority can protect
politically.
In contrast, pro-service voters in Central City and Suburb C will
confront problems implementing an unfunded mandate in their respec-
tive communities because a majority of the locality remains opposed to
the service that, under such a mandate, the majority would be forced to
finance and provide municipally. An unfunded mandate is not self-exe-
cuting; the local administration of an unfinanced obligation imposed by
the state is likely to be reluctant and half-hearted, in contrast to the
performance of a captured state agency, the raison d'etre of which is
67. See, for example, Gen. Stat. Conn. § 10-281 (1986) (requiring municipalities to provide
busing services to residents attending certain nonpublic schools).
68. Theoretically, the pro-service voters of Central City and Suburb C would confront lower
costs if an unfunded mandate from the state imposed the service upon their respective localities.
In Central City, for example, total costs of $400 (four children at $100 each) would be divided 10
ways, resulting in a cost of only $40 per voter. However, the pro-service voters of Central City
cannot obtain this result. A locally impotent minority, the statewide success of Central City pro-
service voters depends upon their alliance with the pro-service voters from Suburbs A and B who,




provision of the public service and which is protected by and thus re-
sponsive to the pro-service statewide majority.
Matters become more complex if there are significant diseconomies
of scale to a state agency. Nevertheless, in this setting, the political pro-
cess at this stage in the development of the model still does not gener-
ate an unfinanced obligation imposed on the localities; rather, it
produces a mandate fully paid for by the state. Suppose, for example,
that providing private school busing locally is comparatively inexpen-
sive because the municipalities already transport public school students
and the marginal cost of expanding service locally to privately educated
pupils is much less than the expense of creating an entirely new state-
owned fleet for such busing. Under such circumstances, the voters of
Suburbs A and B prefer a mandate fully underwritten by the state be-
cause such a mandate would reduce their taxes by spreading costs
statewide. In contrast, an unfunded mandate deprives these voters of
the fruits of their victory, returning them to their communities empty-
handed and to the greater expense of locally financed services. More-
over, the pro-service residents of Central City and Suburb C prefer a
fully financed mandate to one unfunded since complete state funding
helps overcome local recalcitrance in the provision of the service.
Hence, again, an unfunded mandate is the least attractive, and there-
fore the least likely, outcome for the victorious majority.
If the model is modified to make pro-service voters a statewide mi-
nority, the political process still does not generate an unfunded man-
date. Suppose now that the preferences of the electorate are as follows:
Table II
Jurisdiction For Service Against Service
Central City 3 7
Suburb A 2 1
Suburb B 3 1
Suburb C 1 2
Statewide Vote 9 11
In this setting, Suburbs A and B provide the service locally because
majorities in those jurisdictions continue to favor it. However, proposals
to undertake the public activity as a statewide enterprise fail by votes
of nine to eleven. Hence, there will be no choice at the state level from
among a state agency, a fully funded mandate, or an unfunded mandate




Generalizing from these examples, they suggest that direct voting
in a federal system does not generate unfunded mandates. Pro-service
statewide majorities will prefer state-administered programs or fully
funded mandates to spread costs and to obtain friendly administration
while, in a federal system with direct voting, statewide minorities can-
not obtain unfunded mandates (or any other, pro-service outcome) for
the public activity they seek.
The next addition to the public choice model is legislative repre-
sentation. Initially, assume that such representation is without agency
problems 69 as legislators reflect perfectly the preferences of their re-
spective constituents. Under this assumption, Tables I and II no longer
report the choices of the electorate in direct balloting but rather reflect
the votes of state legislators from the four localities, legislators who em-
body without error the predilections of the individuals who selected
them. Once again, unfunded mandates are rejected at the state level.
When pro-service legislators constitute a parliamentary majority, they
obtain for their constitutents more desirable results, state administra-
tion and fully financed mandates, which entail attendant cost spreading
and greater possibilities for sympathetic administration. When pro-ser-
vice representatives constitute a legislative minority, they cannot secure
any statewide support for the public services their constituents desire.
Now suppose that, in comparison with the opponents of public ac-
tivity, the supporters of a public service, expecting to receive concen-
trated benefits from such service, are more organized, better informed,
and more sophisticated in their understanding of the political process
than many anti-service taxpayers. Further postulate that there is slack
in the agency relationship between legislators and the electorate. When
it is difficult for voters to monitor their representatives, those repre-
sentatives can opportunistically pursue their own interests rather than
the preferences of their constituents. Assume additionally that the un-
sophisticated anti-service voter does not comprehend the import of the
unfunded mandate as state legislators thereby impose services without
any perceptible state tax increases to signal the corresponding costs.
While the more knowledgeable pro-service groups understand the
largesse provided to them via state-imposed mandates, the absence of a
discernible state tax increase allows legislators to send a false, anti-ser-
vice signal to their unsophisticated anti-service constituents since such
constituents do not appreciate the link between their municipal tax
bills and their legislators' adoption of unfunded mandates. In Professor
69. For an introduction to issues of agency in the context of political representation, see
Zelinsky, 102 Yale L. J. at 1171-75 (cited in note 60).
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R. Douglas Arnold's terminology, mandates are not "traceable"70 by un-
sophisticated anti-service voters to the legislators who adopt them be-
cause those voters conceive of municipal taxes as single-stage policies
(local decisionmakers levy local taxes) when, in fact, municipal taxes
are multi-stage policies (legislators impose mandates; mandates increase
.local costs; local decisonmakers levy local taxes to cover increased
costs).7 1 Unfunded mandates thus present legislators with the political
temptation to levy hidden municipal taxes. Those taxes are hidden in
the sense that the legislators who are ultimately responsible for the ser-
vice burden triggering such taxes are, for a critical part of the electo-
rate, removed from view and, thus, responsibility.
Given the statewide pro-service majority in Table I, the parliamen-
tary vote again will result in either state financing and administration
of activities favored by the majority coalition or fully funded mandates.
In the alternative case (Table II), the entire anti-service majority easily
understands these two choices, which entail perceptible state tax in-
creases. Correspondingly, the anti-service majority's ability to monitor
legislative performance is strong. Thus, the legislature, without any
slack in its relationship with its majority constituency, implements the
desires of that constituency and rejects the easily comprehended pro-
posals to tax and administer at the state level.
However, the public choice model now generates unfunded man-
dates: When pro-service constituencies confront minority status state-
wide, they accept such mandates as the most they can obtain at the
higher level of government. Poorly monitored legislators opportunisti-
cally supply such mandates to enhance their political positions with
pro-service groups without signalling to their unsophisticated anti-ser-
vice constituents the deal being made at their expense.
To construct this scenario, assume anti-service voters are subdi-
vided into those informed and sophisticated enough to understand un-
funded mandates and those for whom such mandates disguise the
70. See R. Douglas Arnold, The Logic of Congressional Action 18-19, 47 (Yale U., 1990).
Professor Arnold characterizes legislative action as "traceable" to a particular legislator if three
elements are satisfied: (1) the action has "a perceptible effect," (2) the action is "identifiable," and
(3) the legislator's "contribution" to the action is "visible" to the citizenry. Id. at 47. In the public
choice model, unfunded mandates lack the third element because they are not visible to the unso-
phisticated anti-service electorate, which conceives of its municipal taxes as simply levied by local
officials and not as the culmination of events starting in the legislature. See also Cass R. Sunstein,
Public Choice, Endogenous Preferences, 12 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 289, 290 (1992).
71. See, for example, MacManus, Enough Is Enough at 15 (cited in note 57) (recounting that
in a survey of Florida voters, "only 6 percent see states mandates as the major cause of rising
government expenditures. Most to blame are local officials for their irresponsible spending deci-
sions, said over 50 percent of those surveyed .... This is not meant to infer that local officials




substance of a pro-service decision by the legislature. Because their
state taxes do not increase perceptibly under the mandate device, mem-
bers of this latter group incorrectly conclude that their state legislators
faithfully oppose the expansion of public activity. Table III, a modified
version of Table II, describes a legislature reflecting pro-service senti-
ment (nine representatives), sophisticated anti-service voters (seven
representatives), and ill-informed anti-service taxpayers (four repre-
sentatives). The behavior of this last legislative bloc is crucial to the
adoption of unfunded mandates in a public choice world.
Table III
Jurisdiction For Service Against Service
Informed Uninformed
Central City 3 4 3
Suburb A 2 1
Suburb B 3 1
Suburb C 1 2
Statewide Vote 7 4
(Total) 9 11
In this context, proposals to provide the service in an easily ob-
served and understood manner, through either state administration or
through a fully funded mandate, are rejected by a vote of eleven to
nine. As to these proposals, legislators who represent the entire anti-
service majority are readily monitored and possess no discretion, and,
therefore, effectuate the majority's opposition to public activity rather
than impose an observable state tax increase.
When, however, the legislature considers an unfunded mandate,
the ill-informed portion of the anti-service electorate effectively drops
out of the political process. This constituency does not perceive the im-
port of an unfunded mandate because no state tax increase signals the
pro-service nature of the legislature's decision. Consequently, the four
representatives of the unsophisticated anti-service electorate, freed
from the discipline of advancing their constituents' preferences, can ac-
commodate the pro-service minority through an unfunded mandate
without the representatives' constituents comprehending that they are
financing the deal through their municipal taxes.
Some legislators who represent unsophisticated anti-service senti-
ment might resist the temptation to embrace unfunded mandates and
the hidden taxation such mandates entail. Although liberated from ef-
fective monitoring by their constituents, some legislators nevertheless
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might share their constituents' anti-spending ideology and thus oppose
unfunded mandates as a matter of personal belief. Alternatively, some
representatives, as a result of prior experience in local government or a
strongly held belief in home rule, might identify with the municipalities
and, accordingly, oppose unfunded mandates. More self-interestedly, a
legislator representing unknowledgeable anti-service voters might con-
template a return to local government. For example, a legislator plan-
ning to run for mayor might oppose an unfunded mandate for which he
expects in the near future to levy the necessary municipal taxes.72
Nevertheless, under public choice assumptions, most, if not all, of
the four representatives from unknowledgeable anti-service districts
join with the nine representatives from pro-service constituencies to
form a majority in favor of an unfunded mandate. The unfunded man-
date permits these four legislators to satisfy their anti-service consti-
tutents by minimizing state taxes. Unsophisticated anti-service voters
erroneously interpret lower state taxes as implementing their opposi-
tion to public activities, since these voters do not comprehend that
their legislators are increasing the municipal tax burden sub silentio by
imposing unfinanced obligations on the localities.
Simultaneously, the legislators enacting an unfunded mandate
thereby acquire the support of the pro-service constituencies succorred
by the mandate. That support typically translates into campaign contri-
butions and electoral backing in future contests for reelection or higher
office. Even a representative running for mayor might rationally decide
to acquire the support of pro-service groups to bolster his ambitions
through an unfunded mandate, leaving until after his election the ques-
tion of paying the bill.
The pro-service constituencies in Central City and Suburb C,
which are local minorities, would accept an unfunded mandate as their
only means of obtaining the government activity they seek since they
can neither obtain such activity locally nor secure financing on a state-
wide basis.
Participation in the statewide mandate coalition of the pro-service
constituencies that dominate their respective communities presents a
more complex problem. Because these locally dominant voters are ma-
jorities at home, they can obtain services municipally, and, they, unlike
their counterparts in Central City and Suburb C, do not need a state-
wide mandate to secure the public activity they desire. Moreover, par-
ticipation in the mandate coalition entails costs and risks for these
locally dominant voters and their representatives. For legislators from
72. In New Jersey, legislators frequently serve simultaneously in municipal office. See note
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Suburbs A and B, participation in the formulation of the mandate stat-
ute diverts time and energy from other tasks to obtain for their constit-
uents a service they already receive locally.7 3 For the residents of
Suburbs A and B, mandate legislation poses risks to their local auton-
omy because the mandate, once adopted, might evolve in a fashion con-
trary to their preferences.
Offsetting these legislative transactions' costs and risks to local au-
tonomy, the pro-service voters of Suburbs A and B may support the
statewide mandate coalition from ideological affinity with like-minded
voters in other localities or from a perception of spillover benefits gen-
erated by public activities in the other two municipalities. Most tangi-
bly, however, voters from Suburbs A and B, through their elected
representatives, seek cost-sharing at the state level for their participa-
tion in a statewide coalition.
Hence, in this example, some state financing must be used to entice
legislators from Suburbs A and B into the statewide mandate coalition.
However, such financing must be kept sufficiently low to avoid state tax
increases that would alert unsophisticated anti-service voters and make
their representatives' pro-service decision traceable. Consequently, the
outcome in Table III is a partially funded mandate. If the voters of
Suburbs A and B are quite ideological or have a strong sense of positive
externalities, relatively little cost-sharing at the state level is necessary
to bring their representatives within the statewide coalition. If, on the
other hand, these voters are more cost driven or if the legislative trans-
actions' costs or risks to local autonomy from a particular mandate are
high, the legislators from Suburbs A and B will participate in the pro-
service coalition only if the state assumes a higher percentage of the
service's costs, subject to the constraint that, if the state absorbs too
much, the resulting state tax increase will signal the otherwise passive
anti-service electorate and stimulate it to oppose the mandate. Chart I
develops this analysis.
73. On the costs of decisionmaking, see James B. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The













The y axis of Chart I measures the amount of state money funding
any particular mandate. At point 0 on the y axis, localities receive no
reimbursement for the duties the state imposes on them; point R, at the
other end, reflects full state financing. The x axis ranks proposed man-
dates, with those on the left requiring less state money to secure legisla-
tive support from locally dominant pro-service groups. Moving right on
the x axis, mandates require progressively more state financing to se-
cure backing from voters capable of obtaining services municipally. The
horizontal line CD marks the level of state funding which alerts unso-
phisticated anti-service constituencies via state tax increases; below CD,
legislators can appropriate state monies without alerting these anti-ser-
vice voters. CD thus demarcates the upper boundary of the zone of dis-
cretion within which representatives of the unsophisticated anti-service
electorate can accommodate pro-service groups without alerting that
electorate.
Finally, the diagonal OT reflects for each mandate on the x axis the
level of state financing necessary to secure the support of constituencies
capable of acquiring the service locally. Mandate 1, at point 0, needs no
state financing to attract the representatives from Suburbs A and B
into the statewide coalition; in contrast, Mandate X, at point N, must
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be fully funded to attract to the statewide coalition representatives of
locally dominant pro-service voters.
In Chart I, the legislature imposes and partially funds Mandates 1
through Q since, for these mandates, statewide majorities can be
formed without the state committing the level of resources that would
catalyze the opposition of unsophisticated anti-service voters. The legis-
lature eschews Mandates Q through X since too much state funding is
necessary to attract to the coalition representatives of pro-service voters
who can obtain the service municipally and a legislative majority can-
not be obtained without these representatives.
Hence, the public choice model suggests that, when a pro-service
coalition need not offer significant cost sharing to muster support from
locally dominant constituencies, the state provides little or no funding
for the mandate the coalition seeks. On the other hand, when the state-
wide coalition must use cost-sharing to attract locally dominant pro-
service voters and their representatives to create a legislative majority,
the mandate is more heavily funded by the state, but never heavily
enough to awaken the opposition of the quiescent portion of the anti-
service electorate.
CD might be lowered by an external event (such as a controversial
property tax revaluation or an effective publicity campaign by the
state's mayors) that sensitizes the anti-service electorate, focusing its
attention on the link between unfunded mandates and municipal tax
bills. In that case, the legislature will reject some mandates it would
have adopted previously. CD will subsequently drift back upward as the
crisis (or publicity campaign) ebbs from memory and the attention of
the anti-service electorate becomes less focused and intense. The legis-
lature then reverts to business as usual, adopting again the mandates it
eschewed during the period of reduced discretion.
To refine the public choice model, the model must account for log-
rolling.74 A relatively powerful 5 interest obtains for itself an unfunded
mandate without the assistance of allies in the legislative process. At
the other end of the spectrum, some groups are too small to logroll
themselves into an effective coalition and thus cannot, even in concert,
secure mandates for themselves; alliances composed of many weak in-
terests are difficult to assemble and police because each member of the
coalition is prone to freeload on the efforts of its putative allies. How-
ever, in the middle of the spectrum, groups at intermediate levels of
74. See generally Thomas Stratmann, The Effects of Logrolling on Congressional Voting, 82
Am. Econ. Rev. 1162 (1992).
75. "Relatively" powerful because, in contrast to the groups securing state-financed and ad-




influence need to and can organize themselves into successful coalitions
to secure unfunded mandates.
To explore the logrolling aspects of the mandate phenomenon, as-
sume initially that three groups"6 seeking different public services fash-
ion themselves into a single voting block, that none of the three groups
by itself commands a statewide majority, that legislative representation
does not entail any agency problems, and that the world remains imper-
fectly Tiebout-like. 77 Table IV reflects, under these assumptions, the
preferences among voters as manifested both in local decisionmaking
and in the positions of the legislators representing them in the state
government.
Table IV
Jurisdiction For Service Against Service
X Y Z
Central City 2 1 7
Suburb A 2 1
Suburb B 3 1
Suburb C 1 2
Statewide Vote
(for each service) 3 5 1
Statewide Vote
(Total) 9 11
In this world, Suburbs A and B provide service Y municipally
since, in those two communities, a majority of the local electorate favors
that particular activity; Central City and Suburb C provide none of the
three public services because, in those localities, a majority cannot be
mustered for any particular activity or for the three activities as a
package.
Moreover, in this political climate, legislators representing pro-ser-
vice voters cannot logroll themselves into a statewide majority since
their potential coalition has fewer legislative votes (nine) than the op-
posing statewide bloc against public activity (eleven). On these facts,
the political process does not generate an unfunded mandate or any
other pro-service statewide outcome.
76. This is not to say that these three groups are the only pro-service interests confronting
the legislature. As the text indicates, some groups need not logroll to gain support; other groups
are too small and numerous to form an effective coalition.
77. See note 64 and accompanying text.
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Suppose, however, that the preferences of voters (and thus of their
legislators) are reflected in Table V.
Table V
Jurisdiction For Service Against Service
X Y Z
Central City 3 1 6
Suburb A 3 0
Suburb B 2 1 1
Suburb C 1 2
Statewide Vote
(for each service) 4 5 2
Statewide Vote
(Total) 11 9
In this context, Suburb A provides service Y locally; Suburb B fur-
nishes services Y and Z since the pro-service voters in that community
constitute a majority bloc. None of the three public activities is offered
municipally in Central City or Suburb C since, in those two jurisidic-
tions, no pro-service majority can be formed locally.
Turning to a possible statewide coalition, pro-service constituencies
in Table V can combine themselves into a majority at this higher level
of government. As demonstrated above, 8 an unfunded mandate, which
returns tax assessment and service provision to the municipalities, is
the least attractive victory for such a coalition since such an outcome
denies cost spreading to the voters of Suburbs A and B while subjecting
the pro-service voters of Central City and Suburb C to hostile local ad-
ministration. To disperse costs statewide and to overcome local opposi-
tion, the controlling coalition in Table V prefers either direct state
administration of the three public activities or fully funded mandates.
Finally, assume some slack in the agency relationship between un-
sophisticated anti-service voters and the state legislators who represent
them, as reflected in Table VI.




Jurisdiction For Service Against Service
X Y Z Informed Uninformed
Central City 2 1 4 3
Suburb A 2 1
Suburb B 3 1
Suburb C 1 2
Statewide Vote 3 5 1 7 4
Statewide Vote
(Total) 9 11
In this case, the pro-service coalition cannot obtain from the state
legislature either state provision of the public activities the coalition
seeks or fully funded mandates since these alternatives would require
state taxes, alerting the anti-service electorate. However, a's a second
(or, more accurately, third) best choice, the coalition can secure for it-
self a package of unfunded mandates by inducing the four representa-
tives elected by unsophisticated anti-service constituencies, poorly
monitored by the voters at home, to join the nine pro-service legislators
in promulgating such a package.
To finalize the public choice model, it must account for the factors
that contract legislators' discretion to adopt mandates. The most im-
portant limiting factor is the political influence of municipal officials in
the legislative process. These officials are the state's most significant
anti-mandate constituency since they must levy local taxes to pay for
mandated services and suffer the consequent political costs. Municipal
officials, unlike the state legislators who impose unfunded mandates,
cannot hide the tax consequences of such mandates from their constitu-
ents and, indeed, will absorb the electoral repercussions of the taxes
needed to pay for mandated costs. The strength of local officials' anti-
mandate pressure depends on many variables, including the personal
lobbying skills of these officials, the quality of their relationships with
individual legislators, the vitality of the state's home rule ideology, the
presence of potential allies with whom municipal officeholders can log-
roll, and historical and institutional factors that can affect legislative
outcomes. Chart II, the ultimate elaboration of the public choice model,
modifies Chart I to account for local officials' efforts to reduce the legis-
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In Chart II, YZ constitutes a lower boundary to that zone enforced
by municipal policymakers. Mandates 1 through H are funded at level
Y due to the intervention of local officials in the legislative process;
Mandates H through Q are financed at levels ranging from Y to C.
When municipal decisionmakers are highly influential in the legis-
lature, YZ approaches CD, constricting the legislature's zone of discre-
tion. In the ultimate case, political pressure from local officeholders
causes YZ to overlap CD, eliminating altogether the legislature's discre-
tionary zone and, with it, unfunded mandates. In that setting, the influ-
ence of municipal officials blocks Mandates 1 through Q; the presence
of the anti-service electorate stops Mandates Q through X.
Alternatively, the model can postulate more limited influence for
local officials, which lowers YZ downward and, with it, mandate funding
levels. At the extreme, YZ overlaps ON and Chart II collapses into
Chart I-that is, municipal officials are incapable of reducing at all leg-
islators' zone of discretion.
The growth and persistence of the new mandates in the face of
near-universal criticism suggests that, notwithstanding the efforts of
municipal officials to reduce the discretionary zone in which unfunded
mandates are adopted, local officials frequently lack the political re-
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sources to reduce that zone appreciably. The repeated enactment of un-
funded mandates reflects the repeated defeat in the legislature of the
mayors' lobby by pro-service constituencies. In the terminology of
Chart II, local officeholders can, with skill and effort, reduce, partially
and temporarily, the zone CFYT. However, over time, that zone tends
to be large and persistent.
How can one explain the apparent inability of local officials, in a
public choice world, to offset the legislative influence of pro-service con-
stituencies? In part, this inability reflects long-term trends in American
politics that have deprived local officials of tangible and intangible re-
sources with which to counteract the influence of pro-service groups.
The decline of party loyalty and party organizations, for example, has
loosened political ties with which municipal policymakers previously
would have swayed legislators against the adoption of unfunded man-
dates. The demise of patronage similarly has deprived mayors of re-
sources with which, in an earlier age, they would have sanctioned
members of the legislature. Conflicting personal ambitions might also
make legislators unresponsive to the anti-mandate pleas of municipal
officials; a legislator might view his community's mayor as a potential
rival down the road for higher office, such as a congressional seat.79
In many cases, political isolation also accounts for municipal offi-
cials' inability to repulse mandate proposals in the legislature. When
pending legislation would impose costs on a broad class of institutions,
the leaders of those institutions become potential allies for the mayors.
When, for example, the legislature considers workers' compensation
rules that burden public and private employers alike, the localities can
join with the business community in opposition. On the other hand, an
unfunded mandate targeted only at municipalities leaves the mayors
bereft of such allies and consequently more vulnerable to the political
influence of the constituency seeking the proposed mandate.
Local decisionmakers, moreover, are disadvantaged in conducting
political trench warfare against pro-service constituencies by the heavy
79. Similarly, U.S. Senators might view warily the anti-mandate complaints of governors who
potentially could unseat them; likewise, a member of the U.S. House of Representatives might
view himself as a long-term political rival of a governor whom he seeks to challenge or whom he
expects to confront for a vacant U.S. Senate seat.
It is interesting to speculate how the mandate phenomenon would have developed in the ab-
sence of the Seventeenth Amendment to the Constitution. Presumably, federal senators elected by
state legislators would have been highly responsive to legislators' anti-mandate complaints and, in
the absence of popular elections, would not have needed to accommodate pro-service constituen-
cies at the expense of such legislators.
New Jersey has an unusual practice of electing municipal officials to the legislature while they
continue to serve in local office. Presumably, a legislator thinks twice about imposing an unfunded
mandate when, as the mayor, he simultaneously must levy the local taxes to pay for the mandate.
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dependence of local budgets on state aid provided by the same legisla-
tors who impose mandates. Pro-service groups can, with relative impu-
nity, inflict on state legislators the most basic forms of political
punishment for opposing their demands; a legislator who consistently
resists the programs of pro-service groups may find himself fighting for
reelection against an opponent underwritten by those groups. At a min-
imum, the threat of such opposition will encourage legislators to coop-
erate, particularly when such cooperation takes the politically cheap
form of unfunded mandates.
In contrast, municipal officers are dependent upon state legislators
for budgetary support and thus constrained from retaliating when such
legislators impose unfunded mandates; the legislator whom local offi-
cials would punish politically for the adoption of an unfinanced man-
date is the same legislator who determines the level of state assistance
received by the locality. Given the heavy reliance of most municipalities
on such assistance, a mayor cannot credibly threaten retaliation against
his city's legislative delegation for supporting unfunded mandates since
the mayor depends on that same delegation to maintain state support
for his city.
Hence, local officials' opposition to unfunded mandates tends to be
diffuse, directed generally against the legislature as an institution
rather than targeted against particular legislators in an electorally po-
tent fashion. Consequently, when legislators decide to use their discre-
tion to accommodate pro-service constituencies, municipal opposition is
often little more than background noise, safely disregarded because of
local dependence on state aid from the legislature.8 0
The inhibiting effect of this budgetary dependence is reinforced by
local officials' collective action problems in opposing mandate-support-
ing legislators. Suppose that, notwithstanding their reliance on state as-
sistance, some mayors contemplate heavy political pressure on pro-
80. Of course, legislators do not have infinite room for budgetary retaliation against local
officials, because much state aid to municipalities responds to constituencies the legislators cannot
ignore. For example, state assistance for local schools greatly concerns teachers' and parents'
groups; these groups protect such assistance and preclude legislators from inordinately reducing it.
Nevertheless, just as a zone of legislative discretion over unfunded mandates exists, there is a
similar area within which legislators can retaliate against local officials who become too aggressive
in their political tactics vis-a-vis the legislature. For example, state assistance formulas often are
quite complicated, making it difficult for interested groups to monitor the nature of the legisla-
ture's decisions. Some constituencies are more sophisticated than others in their understanding of
the legislative process; when the legislature reduces municipal aid aimed at these less sophisticated
constituencies, they may not comprehend fully the legislature's maneuver and blame lodal officials
for service reductions.
In short, although legislators do not have total discretion over levels of assistance to localities,
they have enough control to discipline local officials by threatening budgetary retaliation if those
officials too stridently oppose unfunded mandates.
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mandate legislators by, for example, recruiting alternative candidates
for the legislature and campaigning actively for them. Other mayors,
when deciding whether to join this risky strategy, will reasonably decide
against participation because they fear budgetary retaliation if pro-
mandate incumbents are reelected over mayoral opposition and expect
the legislature to relax its burdens on localities if enough anti-mandate
legislators are elected from other communities. Hence, the rational
strategy for any particular mayor ex ante is to freeload -on the other
mayors' efforts; as each mayor makes this decision, none engages in ef-
fective anti-mandate activity in his own community.
One would thus expect-that, ceteris parabus, in states with one or
two relatively large municipalities (for example, New York, Nebraska),
mayoral anti-mandate pressure is brought to bear on the legislature
more effectively than in states with numerous, equally sized localities
(such as Connecticut) and consequent collective action problems within
their mayors' lobbies.
Finally, local officials face a great rhetorical disadvantage in oppos-
ing mandates.8' To anti-service voters, who conceive of municipal taxa-
tion as a one-stage process and thus solely the responsibility of local
officials,' 2 anti-mandate rhetoric is an exercise in blame-shifting, an at-
tempt by municipal decisionmakers to shift responsibility for their ac-
tions onto others. To pro-service voters, anti-mandate rhetoric is anti-
service rhetoric. Mayors who oppose state-imposed special education
8 3
obligations may protest that they are not against special education but
only object to the state's failure to finance it. Nevertheless, supporters
of special education mandates can easily characterize the mayors as op-
posed substantively to their cause. The public choice model suggests
there is force to this characterization; for groups receiving unfunded
mandates, the alternative typically is no services at all since these
groups lack the political clout to obtain local provision of or full state
funding for the services they seek.
The public choice model further suggests that the validity of the
Tiebout assumption is an important determinant of the level of state
funding for mandates. If many voters cluster within separate, homoge-
neous municipalities according to their shared preferences for public
81. See, for example, Koch, 61 Pub. Interest at 44 (cited in note 24) (asking, "[W]ho can vote
against clean air and water, or better access and education for the handicapped?").
82. To reiterate an earlier point, the lessons of the public choice model readily apply to fed-
erally enacted mandates. Just as the unsophisticated anti-service voter views local taxation as a
one-stage process and thus the unequivocal responsibility of municipal decisionmakers, he views
his state taxes as the sole province of the legislature and the governor, and thus dismisses their
anti-mandate rhetoric as an effort to shift responsibility for their decisions onto federal officials.
83. Here, again, this Article speaks illustratively with special education merely an example of
one of the many good causes creating rhetorical problems for mandate opponents.
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services, they obtain such services locally. Accordingly, more cost shar-
ing is required to induce these locally dominant voters and their repre-
sentatives into a statewide pro-service coalition. On the other hand, if
taxpayers are not clustered by service preferences but are more ran-
domly distributed among municipalities, fewer pro-service taxpayers ac-
quire public activities locally. Hence, more pro-service taxpayers, via
their representatives, join the state-level pro-mandate coalition simply
to secure desired services rather than to demand cost-sharing by the
state.
This observation in turn implies that the suburbanization of the
American metropolis underlies the contemporary mandate problem.
8 4
Many commentators attribute the growth of unfunded mandates to re-
source constraints and a consequent tendency to shift public expendi-
tures onto lower tiers of government.8 5 Indeed, under the public choice
model, reduced state revenues encourage legislators to dispense un-
funded mandates to accommodate interest groups without alerting anti-
service taxpayers via state tax increases.
However, the public choice model suggests that the progressive
maturation of suburban communities is a deeper, underlying cause of
the mandate phenomenon. Consider the early years of suburbanization,
during which an initial wave of city dwellers departs to previously rural
localities, transforming these localities into bedroom communities. In
this opening stage of metropolitan decentralization, the Tiebout pat-
tern-relatively small, homogeneous populations segregated by public
service and tax preferences-accurately depicts the new commuter com-
munities ringing the city. These recently settled suburbs are an unlikely
source of mandate pressure in the state legislature since voters in each
such community obtain locally the services they desire. Because pro-
posed state mandates attract suburban support only with significant
cost-sharing, such mandates are unattractive to the legislature. More-
over, the departure of voters from the city reduces the number of politi-
cal losers in the city, which diminishes the urban constituencies that
seek desired services via state-imposed mandates.
However, as the suburbs grow and mature, their populations be-
come more heterogeneous. Consequently, suburban political processes
include more losers who cannot obtain municipally the public services
they desire and who thus resort to unfunded mandates as acceptable (if
suboptimal) outcomes.
84. Suburbanization is not the only such cause. As the Article discusses below, the evolution
of legislatures from part-time, amateur bodies with strong party organizations into full-time, pro-
fessional bodies with weak party structures also underpins the growth of the new mandates.
85. See, for example, Rivlin, Reviving the American Dream at 107-09 (cited in note 32).
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The public choice model also implies that unfunded mandates re-
flect the relative political weakness of the groups obtaining them. This
conclusion will seem paradoxical to local policymakers, who perceive
these groups as overpowering opponents in the legislature. Indeed, con-
stituencies that acquire unfunded mandates are, by definition, more po-
litically successful than pro-service groups that lack sufficient electoral,
organizational, and financial resources to secure from the legislature
any satisfaction for their demands. However, in comparison with the
clienteles that obtain direct state administration of their demands or
fully-financed mandates, groups that secure unfunded mandates are the
bronze medalists of the political race; they are denied the benefits of
complete, statewide cost-sharing and risk in their home communities
unsympathetic administration of the public services they seek.
Finally, the public choice model suggests that unfunded mandates
are a particularly troubling variant of the concentrated benefit-dis-
persed cost paradigm central to public choice analysis.86 Under this
model, mandates are properly characterized as concentrated benefit-
hidden cost legislation. As long as legislators stay within the zone of
discretion, below the level of state financing that alerts unsophisticated
anti-service voters, 7 those voters will not perceive the costs thrust upon
them by their own (nominally anti-service) representatives. Pro-service
groups invest time and resources monitoring and rewarding legislators
in expectation of significant and obvious returns from their efforts. Un-
sophisticated anti-service taxpayers, on the other hand, do not engage
in comparable issue-by-issue oversight of the legislature since, for them,
the stakes involved in mandates are hidden from view.
IV. THE PUBLIC INTEREST MODEL OF UNFUNDED MANDATES:
EXTERNALITIES, MULTIPLE JURISDICTIONS, AND COLLECTIVE ACTION
PROBLEMS
This Part presents an alternative model of unfunded mandates, a
model premised on the assumption that legislators act to advance the
public interest rather than to accommodate pro-service constituencies.88
While the public choice perspective on mandates is substantially more
convincing, 9 the public interest model provides a useful contrast and
proves particularly helpful when examining the recommendations of the
anti-mandate school, recommendations which, paradoxically, are gener-
86. See, for example, Maxwell L. Stearns, The Public Choice Case Against the Item Veto, 49
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 385, 402 (1992).
87. That is, level CD of state financing in Charts I and H. See p. 1379 and p. 1384.
88. As is the case with the public choice model of unfunded mandates, the public interest
model readily applies to the federal Congress as well as executives and administrators.
89. See text accompanying notes 122-29.
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ally more consistent with the benign, public interest interpretation of
the mandate phenomenon.90 From the public interest perspective, un-
funded mandates maximize welfare in a world of multiple localities, in-
terjurisdictional spillovers, and collective action problems while
preserving a measure of local autonomy. The public interest setting
reverses the heroes and victims of the public choice scenario. Public-
regarding state legislators impose unfunded obligations upon localities
to optimize the municipal production of positive externalities or to min-
imize negative externalities stemming from the decisions of local gov-
ernments; the anti-mandate plaints of municipal officials reflect either
shortsightedness or the desire to freeload on the public services pro-
vided by surrounding jurisdictions.
To construct this alternative model, start with a public activity
provided only by Central City, which the City can undertake at various
levels. Assume, for example, that the City's harbor is the metropolitan
region's only commercial port facility and that potential publicly fi-
nanced port improvements range from the modest to the extravagant.
Suppose also that more limited renovations of the harbor's infrastruc-
ture would principally benefit Central City and its residents through
jobs and local tax revenues; more extensive renovations would trans-
form the port into a regional facility with additional benefits accruing
to suburban jursidictions and their residents. Chart III illustrates this
situation.






In Chart III, the x axis measures the level of investment in the
City's port with rightward movement indicating greater expenditures on
harbor infrastructure. The y axis measures the benefits from port im-
provements with upward movement on the axis reflecting greater levels
of benefits. The diagonal SS depicts the prevailing supply curve. DCDC
represents the demand curve for the City's policymakers; each point re-
flects a quantity of port improvements and a corresponding level of
benefits for City residents. DRDR represents the demand curve for the
entire region. For each possible level of port expenditures, DRDR is
higher than the corresponding point on DCDC since DRDR incorpo-
rates gains to suburbanites as well as to City dwellers.91
Left to their own devices, the leaders of Central City maximize the
welfare of their constituents at point A where quantity M of port im-
provements generates level Q of benefits to City residents. However, for
the region as a whole, M constitutes underinvestment; quantity N of
harbor renovations produces for suburban residents cost-effective, in-
91. The gap between DRDR and DCDC progressively widens as it moves rightward. As the
port becomes larger in scope, it becomes more of a regional facility, yielding proportionately




cremental gains captured by the distance between Q and R on the y
axis.
In response to the prospect of such underinvestment, suburban lo-
calities might agree to reimburse the City for the additional improve-
ments measured by the segment MN. However, given a multiplicity of
suburban jurisdictions, the high transactions costs of negotiating an
agreement and freeloading by some suburbs could impede regional ac-
cord. The creation of a metropolitan port authority encompassing the
City and all its suburbs provides a more likely solution. The leaders of
such an authority, charged with optimizing benefits for the entire re-
gion, will undertake level N of port improvements and will spread the
costs over a metropolitan tax base. However, the City might resist the
creation of a regional authority because such an authority would divest
the City of all control over the port. Hence, the state, through a grant-
in-aid, might instead change the costs confronting the City's policymak-
ers, thereby inducing them to build the regional facility while permit-
ting the port to remain in local hands. Specifically, the state could pay
the City the amount represented by segment MN in return for the
City's commitment to expand its port infrastructure to level N.
Assuming a public-regarding legislature, the model in this initial
stage does not generate an unfunded mandate. While a suburban-domi-
nated legislature could force the City to maintain the harbor at point N
without reimbursing urban taxpayers for the extra cost MN, an un-
reciprocated, unfinanced mandate of this sort would be as opportunistic
as the mandates that arise in a public choice world; such a mandate
would nakedly redistribute costs from urban to suburban taxpayers in
violation of the premise of a public-spirited legislature.
To elaborate the public interest model so that all localities can gen-
erate benefits for surrounding communities, suppose that Suburb A
owns the region's only airport, that Suburb B possesses the metropoli-
tan area's train station, that Suburb C contains a highway interchange
of regional importance, and that each of the three suburbs confronts
alternatives like those faced by the City in Chart III (a smaller facility
which principally benefits the locality or a larger facility which gener-
ates cost-effective spillovers for the other jurisdictions). Suppose fur-
ther that each locality would receive more spillover benefits from
expanded structures in the other three municipalities than the cost in-
curred by the locality in enlarging its own particular facility to the met-
ropolitan optimum. 9 2 Chart IV below describes the costs and benefits of
92. Note that in the development of the public interest model of unfunded mandates, it is
necessary to assume that there is no subsidization between the metropolitan municipalities be-
cause the externalities each community receives from its neighbors are at least large enough to
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expanding each community's facility and is identical to Chart III, ex-
cept that the gains accruing to the three neighboring jurisdictions have
been subdivided among those jurisdictions. The segment QX, for exam-















Like the Central City, each suburb, left to its own devices, rehabili-
tates its respective structure until the marginal benefit for its residents
equals the marginal cost of further refurbishment, which leads to four
instances of metropolitan underinvestment. However, each jurisdiction
would augment its well-being by enlarging its facility in return for the
other three localities' agreement to do likewise. The City, for example,
would maximize the welfare of its residents by expanding port improve-
ments from M to N if, in return, the City receives its spillover benefits,
QX, from a larger airport, train station, and highway interchange.
Such a regionally coordinated outcome might be achieved again
through interjurisdictional bargaining, through the creation of a metro-
offset its own mandated costs. If that assumption is relaxed, unfunded mandates suffer from the
same redistributive flaw as grants-in-aid; that is, some localities incur mandated costs exceeding
the positive externalities they receive from other jurisdictions and thus must subsidize those other
jurisdictions via mandated activity. This issue is discussed in text accompanying notes 127-28 and
is an important reason for ultimately rejecting the public interest model.
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politan authority that assumes ownership of all four of the region's
transportation facilities, or through state grants-in-aid to each of the
four communities to induce expansion of its particular facility to point
N.
However, a public-regarding legislature might also realize the opti-
mizing outcome through a network of reciprocal, unfunded mandates,
ordering each municipality to enlarge its respective structure to level N.
Such an approach avoids the collective action problems of interjurisdic-
tional bargaining, which is costly to conduct and vulnerable to freeload-
ing tactics. In contrast to a metropolitan authority, which eliminates all
local control, mandates recognize each community's interest in retain-
ing residual authority over the facility within its boundaries. Moreover,
state grants entail an unwarranted subsidy of the metropolitan region
by taxpayers outside the region, for example, residents of the state's
rural counties who do not benefit from improved infrastructure in the
state's urbanized zone but who, under state-financed grants, subsidize
that infrastructure through their state taxes. On the assumptions of the
public interest model, unfunded mandates avoid this redistribution
since their costs fall only upon the metropolitan area's taxpayers, who
benefit from the mandated expansion of the region's infrastructure.9 3
Hence, the public-regarding legislature turns to mandates as the most
appropriate means of coordinating the municipal production of in-
terjursidictional externalities.
In this context, local officials might welcome, or even initiate, the
legislature's adoption of the network of reciprocal mandates, favoring
state legislation to overcome collective action problems while maximiz-
ing the welfare of the localities.
Generalizing further, assume now that all regional transportation
facilities are located in the City, that most public school children are
educated in the suburbs, that expanded transportation infrastructure
generates positive externalities for the suburbs while the benefits of
better public schooling spill over to the City, and that a coordinated
expansion of activity generates for each locality more positive spillovers
received than additional costs incurred. 4 In such circumstances, state
legislators pursuing the public interest maximize the welfare of the
metropolitan area by obliging the City to maintain transportation facili-
ties at the higher level benefitting the suburbs while simultaneously im-
posing on suburban school systems more costly requirements that local
93. As noted earlier, this unrealistic assumption provides an important reason for rejecting
the public interest model.




decisionmakers would otherwise eschew because the benefits accrue to
the City.
In this world, anti-mandate complaints from local policymakers re-
flect either shortsightedness or the desire to freeload. Viewed in isola-
tion, it seems reasonable for Central City's mayor to chastise the
legislature for forcing his municipality to maintain regional transporta-
tion facilities without providing the necessary funds. However, in the
context of a network of reciprocal mandates, some of which help the
City and its residents, such criticism appears myopic, overlooking the
gains that inure to the City from the mandates simultaneously imposed
on suburban localities. Alternatively, the mayor's criticism of state laws
requiring the City to maintain regional infrastructure might reflect
shrewd opportunism on his part, a game of pick-and-choose to retain
the spillovers benefitting his constituents while relieving his jurisdiction
of the obligation to contribute to the reciprocal network of interjuris-
dictional externalities. Either way, in the public interest model, legisla-
tors should disregard mayors' opposition to unfunded mandates as
reflecting either shortsightedness or the desire to freeload, or both.
The public interest model further suggests that unfunded man-
dates can properly, if somewhat paradoxically, be characterized as de-
vices for preserving local control, a characterization most municipal
officials would resist. If, however, state policymakers seek a strong re-
sponse to the existence of interjursidictional spillovers, state-imposed
mandates protect local control better than the alternative, metropolitan
authorities, because mandates, while constraining municipal govern-
ments, permit them residual authority, thereby accommodating some
measure of local self-governance.
Consider now a final variation of the public interest model in which
potential negative externalities impel local decisionmakers to ask the
legislature to impose unfinanced mandates upon them as a bonding de-
vice. Suppose that the four communities in the hypothetical metropoli-
tan region decide to increase appreciably their educational spending,
boosting substantially per pupil outlays. Assume further an important
degree of mobility among communities and significant Tiebout reloca-
tion between localities in response to large differences in public
services.
The four municipalities might implement their agreement to in-
crease school outlays via an unfunded mandate adopted at their behest
by the legislature. Since legislators already bargain on a daily basis, it
might be transactionally more efficient for the localities to negotiate the
details of their agreement through the agency of their legislators rather
than conducting ad hoc negotiations on their own. More importantly,
embodying their compact in state legislation ensures the enforceability
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of its terms and precludes future freeloading by one of the four locali-
ties if it experiences a change of heart. Suppose, for example, that, in
the next municipal election, anti-service forces might obtain control of
Suburb A and seek to repudiate the prior administration's commitment
to increase school spending, thds triggering an outflow of school age
families from Suburb A into the other three communities. To prevent
this possibility, the current leadership of the four communities would
ask the legislature to codify their agreement in a state statute requiring
higher minimum educational outlays. With such a statute in place, Sub-
urbs B and C and Central City can more securely increase their own
school expenditures, knowing that new leadership in Suburb A must, as
a matter of state law, maintain the school spending levels to which their
predecessors agreed.
In this setting, mandated educational spending reflects neither the
legislature's opportunistic accommodation of groups interested in
higher school expenditures nor the maximization of affirmative spil-
lovers from education. Rather, the state's mandate avoids a negative
externality, that is, the anticipated emigration of families with school
age children if one community were to renounce its commitment to in-
crease school spending.
V. RESPONDING TO MANDATES
A. Overview
With the public choice and public interest models in place, this Ar-
ticle now examines the remedies of the anti-mandate school and con-
cludes that these remedies generally will not deter higher-level
policymakers from imposing unfinanced obligations on subordinate
units of government. The conventional proposals of the anti-mandate
school do not address the heart of the problem: the zone of discretion in
which poorly monitored, self-serving legislators accommodate pro-ser-
vice constituencies without alerting the unsophisticated portion of the
anti-service electorate. Ironically, the program of the anti-mandate
school is more consistent with the public interest model and its benign
view of unfunded mandates than with the more critical public choice
analysis of such mandates. This Part concludes that only conferring
upon lower tiers of government the constitutional power of prospective
nullification, that is, the constitutional right to ignore a mandate in the
absence of full cost reimbursement provided ab initio, can decisively
deter such unfunded mandates. Under such a scheme, as yet untried by
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any state,95 legislatures will adopt mandates only when a centralized
state agency entails diseconomies of scale and fully funded mandates
utilize economies of local service provision.
This Part, as the previous two, speaks in terms of state impositions
on local governments and legislative behavior. However, its conclusions
readily extend to federal mandates levied on states and localities and to
the actions of executives and administrators.
B. Disclosure
At first blush, fiscal notes seem likely to discourage unfunded man-
dates by enhancing anti-service voters' abilities to monitor legislators,
thus preventing such legislators from satisfying the demands of pro-ser-
vice constituencies. In Chart I,96 cost projections for proposed mandates
promise to educate the unsophisticated anti-service electorate, lowering
the threshhold, CD, at which it perceives the effects of unfunded man-
dates, thereby reducing the zone of discretion in which opportunistic
officials can placate pro-service interest groups. At its most effective,
disclosure promises to lower CD to the x axis, precluding the legislature
from imposing any unfinanced obligations on localities.
Implicitly, this analysis appeals to the example of disclosure in
market settings and to the belief that disclosure ensures efficient mar-
ket outcomes. If better information improves market outcomes, by anal-
ogy, better information should also improve legislative results by
deterring unfunded mandates.
Contrary to this comforting story, fiscal notes generally are judged
ineffective in practice.97 The most common explanation for this failure
is the allegedly low caliber of data furnished during the legislative pro-
cess. Fiscal notes, the argument runs, are often of poor quality and thus
do not generate the desired impact on public opinion or legislative de-
liberations. Under this line of thought, the appropriate remedy is the
development of better information about proposed mandates by trained
professionals independent of the legislature. 98
95. As yet, no state has attempted this scheme. See note 119.
96. See p. 1379.
97. See notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
98. See, for example, South Carolina Advisory Commission, State Mandated Local Govern-
ment Expenditures at 68 (cited in note 48) (claiming that "[t]he fiscal note should be prepared by
a neutral, quantitatively sophisticated group"); Samuel D. Mamet, Mandates-Help or Hin-
drance?, Colorado Municipalities 8, 12 (Jan.-Feb. 1988) (explaining that "[a]n effective fiscal notes
process which adequately identifies the fiscal impact of state legislation on local governments is a
cornerstone to adequately assessing the state mandate problem"); Kelly, State Mandates at v
(cited in note 48) (warning that "those charged with the preparation of fiscal notes cannot or do
not provide accurate and reliable cost estimates to the legislature").
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However, three factors suggest that in a public choice world, even
the most expertly prepared cost estimates will not inhibit legislatures
from adopting proposed mandates. First, the transactions costs of as-
similating information make it improbable that many voters will, on
their own, absorb the data contained in fiscal notes. Second, the control
of the electoral process by the mean, rather than the marginal, voter
makes disclosure politically potent only in the unlikely event that the
disclosed information is widely absorbed by the electorate. Finally, the
heavy dependence of municipalities on state assistance inhibits local of-
ficeholders from disseminating to voters data about state-imposed un-
funded mandates in a politically effective manner.
Assume that each of the four legislators representing unsophistica-
ted anti-service sentiment in Table II19 has one thousand constituents.
Suppose further that high quality fiscal notes, prepared by an indepen-
dent professional staff, accurately quantify the financial implications of
proposed mandates.
Giving such fiscal notes to the four legislators will not affect their
behavior; these legislators, by the hypotheses of the public choice
model, already understand the opportunistic maneuvers in which they
are engaged. The problem is not that these legislators are poorly in-
formed but that they are poorly monitored. At most, fiscal notes are
minor irritants to these political entrepreneurs, easily disregarded as
the legislators maximize their political self-interests by accommodating
pro-service groups without alerting their anti-service constituents.
A legislator's inclination to ignore fiscal notes will be reinforced by
the knowledge that it is time consuming and costly for mandate oppo-
nents to disseminate this data to his electorate 00 or, more precisely, to
the bloc of 501 voters, including the mean voter, who can prevent the
legislator's reelection. 01 While municipal officials should in theory
spread among voters information about unfunded mandates and the op-
portunistic behavior of the legislators adopting them, in practice most
local officeholders will not deploy aggressively data from fiscal notes for
fear of offending the legislators on whom the localities simultaneously
depend for significant financial assistance. 02
99. See p. 1376.
100. Indeed, the transactions costs associated with the dissemination and absorption of infor-
mation lie at the heart of the agency problem, allowing poorly monitored agents to pursue their
interests rather than the interests of their principals. See, for example, John W. Pratt and Richard
J. Zeckhauser, Principals and Agents: An Overview, in John W. Pratt and Richard J. Zeckhauser,
Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business 4-8 (Harv. Bus. Sch., 1985); Zelinsky, 102 Yale
L. J. at 1165 (cited in note 60).
101. See Musgrave and Musgrave, Public Finance at 104 (cited in note 27).
102. See text accompanying note 80.
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Furthermore, the information contained in fiscal notes will not be
particularly helpful to a potential challenger for the seat of a mandate-
supporting legislator. Opposition to unfunded mandates will not gener-
ate support among the pro-service groups benefitting from such man-
dates. For unsophisticated anti-service taxpayers, who perceive
municipal taxation as a single-stage process and thus the sole responsi-
bility of local officeholders, anti-mandate rhetoric is an unconvincing
attempt by the legislative challenger to blame the incumbent for munic-
ipal taxes levied, not by him, but by local officials. For these voters, the
challenger should be addressing state issues, not meddling in local
affairs.
The market analogy highlights the weakness of disclosure as a de-
vice for altering legislative outcomes. In market settings, information is
effective without wide absorption since relatively few knowledgable pur-
chasers and sellers at the margin determine outcomes for the market as
a whole. Suppose, for example, that each of one thousand voters holds a
corporation's stock, which new research indicates is undervalued at the
prevailing price. Assimilation of this information by even a single share-
holder can drive the market price to its efficient level.103 Moreover, the
network of brokers and financial advisors, anticipating direct and indi-
rect compensation for bringing fresh information to investors, will dis-
seminate newly available data as effectively as possible.
In contrast, information about unfunded mandates, absorbed by a
single, marginal voter, will not deter an opportunistic legislator from
exploiting the ignorance of his 999 other anti-service constituents.
Given the dependence of local officials on state assistance, no effective
network will undertake the daunting task of disseminating data about
mandates to the mass of anti-service taxpayers, assuming that any level
of information can force these voters to jettison their one-stage view of
municipal taxation.
Relaxing many of the foregoing assumptions will not affect the ba-
sic conclusions. If, for example, no single, well-informed investor pos-
sesses or can borrow the resources to buy undervalued stock until the
stock's price accurately reflects its economic value, relatively few knowl-
edgable purchasers can, at the margin, accquire stock until its price em-
bodies currently available information. Disclosure thus affects the
market's outcome even though the bulk of the market's participants re-
main uninformed. 10 4 Similarly, when relaxing the postulates of median
103. For more extensive treatment of these issues, see generally Alan Schwartz and Louis L.
Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and
Security Interests, 69 Va. L. Rev. 1387 (1983).
104. See generally id.
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voter theory, suppose that a winning candidate assembles his majority
by aggregating different blocs concerned about different issues. The
fundamental analysis stands: disclosure about mandates is unlikely to
impact electoral outcomes not only because many voters must absorb
such information to make a difference, but also because municipal offi-
cials, the obvious network to disseminate data generated by fiscal notes,
will be reluctant to offend legislators with significant power over such
officials' budgets. In sum, under public choice assumptions, improving
the quality of fiscal notes will not change the fundamental political dy-
namics underlying unfunded mandates.
Paradoxically, improved fiscal notes, advanced by the anti-mandate
school to discourage unfunded mandates, are quite consistent with the
public interest model and its benign view of such mandates. While bet-
ter information may reveal to public-regarding lawmakers that they
have underestimated the costs and overestimated the interjurisdictional
benefits 0 5 of mandates and may thus reduce legislators' propensities to
impose unfinanced obligations on municipalities, in a public interest
world, more professionally and independently produced fiscal notes
may also reveal that legislators have heretofore underestimated the
benefits and overassessed the costs of proposed mandates. Conse-
quently, better cost estimates might disclose additional opportunities
for the legislative enhancement of welfare through additional mandates,
leading to more, rather than fewer, of them.
C. Supermajority Rules
Under public choice assumptions, supermajority requirements de-
ter few mandates, given that most anti-service voters are likely to be
unsophisticated and given the possibilities for logrolling among pro-ser-
vice constituencies.
The ability of supermajority requirements to discourage unfunded
mandates depends initially upon the size of the opportunistic legislative
bloc seeking to accommodate pro-service groups without alerting anti-
service constituents. In Chart III, a two-thirds rule0 6 thwarts un-
financed obligations on localities since the critical cluster of four poorly
monitored representatives from anti-service districts falls just short of
the number necessary to combine with the nine pro-service legislators
for a two-thirds majority.
105. Such benefits may either, be the creation of positive externalities or the avoidance of
negative externalities.
106. Such a rule applies, for example, under the Florida and Louisiana state constitutions.
See note 58 and accompanying text.
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However, in a public choice world, it is probable that most anti-
service taxpayers are unsophisticated, that the opportunistic legislative
bloc is accordingly larger than indicated in Chart III and that, conse-
quently, supermajority requirements must approach unanimity to stifle
unfunded mandates. Hence, in the context of unfunded mandates, in
contrast to other settings,10 7 supermajority requirements are unlikely to
affect legislative outcomes; rather, they constitute procedural niceties
easily surmounted by pro-service interest groups.
While it is worthwhile for pro-service voters to understand the
multi-stage policy'0 8 that is the unfunded mandate (since they will
profit significantly from that policy), anti-service voters tend to view
municipal taxation in single-stage terms which are plausible and, in-
deed, appealing. Under this view, local officials are elected to set local
taxes; fingerpointing at other levels of government evades the responsi-
bility that local officials are elected to execute. This one-stage perspec-
tive is reinforced by a form of rational ignorance. 09 While it pays for
pro-service voters to invest their time and energy to understand the
mandates from which they benefit, anti-service voters perceive no com-
parable incentive to overcome their superficial comprehension of the
forces determining their municipal tax bills. Moreover, the only actors
in the political system with incentives to educate anti-service voters
about mandates-municipal officials-have important counterincen-
tives which prevent the education from being too thorough." 0
The anti-service electorate is thus predominantly unsophisticated,
that is, uncomprehending of mandates and their significance, and con-
sequently misled by a low state tax burden into believing that mandate-
dispensing legislators have faithfully implemented an anti-service out-
look. Hence, as long as they stay below the level of state financing that
alerts anti-service voters,"' legislators view the concerned constituen-
cies as lopsidedly favoring unfunded mandates since these attentive
constituencies are overwhelmingly the beneficiaries of such mandates.
107. This argument does not imply that supermajority rules are invariably ineffective; in
many cases, supermajority requirements can affect decisively legislative outcomes. This Article
contends that, in the limited context of unfunded mandates, supermajority requirements are easily
overcome because of the prevalence of unsophisticated anti-service sentiment and logrolling oppor-
tunities. On supermajority requirements more generally, see Buchanan and Tullock, The Calculus
of Consent (cited in note 73); Mueller, Public Choice II (cited in note 60); Saul Levmore, Bicamer-
alism: When Are Two Decisions Better than One?," 12 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 145 (1992).
108. See Arnold, The Logic of Congressional Action at 20 (cited in note 70).
109. On the theory of rational ignorance, see Browning and Browning, Public Finance at 66
(cited in note 27).
110. Municipal officials depend for financial assistance on the same legislators who levy man-
dates. See the discussion in note 80 and accompanying text.
111. That is, level CD of state financing in Chart I. See p. 1379.
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Moreover, pro-service groups can readily surmount supermajority
rules by logrolling or by expanding existing coalitions. Such coalitions
aggregate both the votes of pro-service legislators and the resources
necessary to attract representatives of anti-service constituencies. While
the transactions costs of assembling and policing alliances make it more
expensive for groups to obtain unfunded mandates for themselves, such
costs merely discourage the adoption of mandates at the margin.
Consider, for example, a pro-service constituency which, prior to a
supermajority requirement, can secure for itself an unfunded mandate
with the support of fifty-one percent of the legislature. After the enact-
ment of a two-thirds rule, this constituency finds it necessary to locate
a coalition partner. Similarly, an existing alliance of pro-service groups
will respond to a new supermajority requirement by expanding its
membership.
At the margin, some groups might abandon their mandates rather
than incur the costs of entering into a coalition; some existing logrolls
that need to expand to obtain a supermajority will become unmanage-
able. Some groups possess too few resources, such as too few voters or
too little in campaign contributions, to attract coalition partners and
thus will lack a place in a successful logroll. Neverthless, after the adop-
tion of supermajority rules, groups currently obtaining mandates in a
public choice world generally will pool their resources in explicit or im-
plicit alliance with one another, even though this means they must work
somewhat harder to obtain succor from the legislature.
Consequently, in a world characterized by unsophisticated anti-ser-
vice sentiment and reasonable possibilities for logrolling, one-sided leg-
islative votes for the adoption of unfunded mandates are likely,
rendering supermajority requirements mere formalities in the legislative
process.
From a public interest perspective, supermajority rules can ensure
a proper level of consensus before the legislature imposes an unfunded
mandate. While supermajority requirements occasionally might impede
desirable additions to the network of state-imposed, reciprocal obliga-
tions among localities, these requirements also can secure appropriately
high levels of parliamentary agreement on the existence of spillovers
before the state intervenes in local affairs.
D. Retrospective Reimbursement Regimes
Under public choice assumptions, pro-mandate forces can readily
surmount statutory reimbursement regimes for the same reasons they
can overcome supermajority rules: logrolling opportunities and the
prevalence of unsophisticated anti-service sentiment. Pro-service con-
stituencies that dominate legislative deliberations can induce the legis-
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lature to suspend its self-imposed statutory reimbursement obligation.
Hence, in a public choice world, statutory reimbursement requirements
constitute little more than formalities, easily overpowered by pro-ser-
vice interest groups.
Constitutional reimbursement schemes are more diverse in nature
and thus more complex to analyze. From a public choice perspective,
neither a constitutional provision like Florida's or Louisiana's, which
allows suspension of compensation by a two-thirds vote of the legisla-
ture, nor a constitutitonal scheme like Tennessee's, which authorizes
the adoption of mandates if the state shares some unspecified level of
the costs, is likely to discourage legislators from imposing unfinanced
obligations on localities.112
In contrast, constitutional provisions like California's and Michi-
gan's, which require full funding by the state of most mandates and
empower the courts to enforce such funding, promise to discipline the
legislature by forcing it to confront the complete costs of satisfying pro-
service constitutencies. A judicially enforceable, constitution-based re-
imbursement regime endows localities with the legal resources to sanc-
tion legislators who impose unfinanced obligations as, in the absence of
full funding, localities can resort to the courts, compelling the legisla-
ture to appropriate funding while the localities comply with the man-
date. Such reimbursement reforms the structural relationship between
the state and its localities, attacking the legislative zone of discretion at
the core of the mandate problem by providing municipalities with a ju-
dicial remedy against unfunded mandates.
However, under public choice assumptions, such retrospective re-
imbursement will not deter all unfinanced mandates given delay in re-
imbursement to the localities, legislative procrastination in conforming
to judicial decrees, and a requirement of municipal compliance during
litigation over reimbursement. Suppose, for example, that the legisla-
ture imposes an unfunded obligation upon municipalities in year one,
that municipal entitlement to reimbursement is finally adjudicated in
year four,1 3 and that, while such adjudication is underway, localities
must supply the mandated service without payment from the state . 4
112. However, Professor Janet Kelly suggests that, in practice, Tennessee's anti-mandate
amendment has been more effective than its language would indicate. Kelly, State Mandates at 56
(cited in note 48).
113. California case law suggests that a four-year lag is not atypical between the adoption of
a mandate and the ultimate adjudication of the localities' right of reimbursement.
114. Kathleen Sylvester, The Mandate Blues, 2 Governing 26, 29-30 (Sept. 1989) (noting
that "while California will provide almost $200 million in reimbursements to localities this year,
local officials still contend that the process doesn't really work very well. To begin with, cities and
counties don't have any option about compliance. If they think a mandate causes an undue bur-
den, they must comply while appealing to the Commission on State Mandates .... ).
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In such a setting," 5 the opportunistic legislator of the public choice
model could rationally supply unfinanced mandates, counting on the lag
in the retrospective reimbursement process to postpone the fiscal conse-
quences of accommodating pro-service groups. By year four, when the
costs of that accommodation finally come due, the legislator will have
been re-elected, retired, or risen to higher office. Hence, assuming sig-
nificant delay of mandates' budgetary repercussions, retrospective reim-
bursement will not deter legislators so inclined from supplying pro-
service constituencies with these mandates." 6
Indeed, an opportunistic legislature judicially ordered to under-
write a mandate will simply ignore the court's order until after the next
election and, perhaps, later. This possibility has proved more than
conjectural.
117
In theory, states might shorten the reimbursement delay, thus in-
creasing the likelihood that legislators imposing obligations on localities
must finance them on a reasonably current basis. For example, munici-
palities' constitutional claims for mandate reimbursement can be con-
fided to the original jurisdiction of the state's highest court.",8 In
practice, however, such agreements deserve only limited confidence
given legislators' incentives to disregard judicial reimbursement orders
until at least after the next election, in effect "playing the float" to
their own political advantage.
Under the public interest model, mandate reimbursement is a chi-
mera. If the network of reciprocal mandates is welfare-enhancing, there
is no need to compensate municipalities for undertaking coordinated
activity which increases their well-being. Similarly, there is no need to
discipline legislatures through reimbursement requirements when the
legislatures are doing something they ought to do. In a public interest
world, the litigation spawned by reimbursement controversies repre-
sents deadweight loss, socially unproductive fighting irrelevant to the
115. In a variation of this strategy, the legislature could impose a mandate and deliberately
underfund its reimbursement. Professor Janet Kelly's survey of the states' experience with reim-
bursement arrangements suggests that this is more than a theoretical possibility. Kelly, State
Mandates at 41 (cited in note 48).
116. This analysis is similar to the contention that public officials grant deferred pension
rather than current wage concessions to government employees, expecting the cost to come due
during the terms of their successors.
117. Legislative recalcitrance in complying with constitutionally based court decrees has
been a hallmark of school finance litigation. See, for example, Linda J. Fontaine Fagan, Texas
Special Session Ends with School Funding in Limbo, State Tax Notes (Dec. 11, 1992) (LEXIS,
Estate library, STN file) (describing the failure of the Texas legislature in special session to com-
ply with a court order to reform school funding).
118. However, important constituencies, including the court itself, are likely to object to the
absorption of much of the court's docket by mandate reimbursement cases.
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welfare-maximizing nature of the obligations that public-regarding leg-
islators impose on localities.
E. Prospective Nullification
Constitutional reimbursement in its most thoroughgoing form
would empower localities to nullify a mandate prospectively if the legis-
lature ignores its constitutional obligation to provide full financing." 9
Under such an arrangement, a municipality believing itself burdened by
an unfunded mandate would not comply with it. The state would then
sue to enforce its mandate if it believed that adequate payment was
being provided. Critical to such an arrangement would be the preroga-
tive of the objecting municipality to ignore the challenged mandate
during the litigation with the state.
The right of prospective nullification would deprive unfunded man-
dates of most of their value to pro-service groups since, in the face of
such mandates, unwilling localities would not provide the required ser-
vice. Under a prospective nullification scheme, unfunded mandates
might serve for pro-service constituencies a symbolic purpose or a tacti-
cal function in obtaining eventual financing from the legislature or in
securing desired services in closely divided communities. 120 Neverthe-
less, prospective nullification would deprive unfunded mandates of
119. The state coming closest to a rule of prospective nullification is Florida, the constitution
of which provides that localities shall not "be bound" by unfunded state mandates. Fla. Const.,
Art. VII, § 18. However, the seemingly broad protection thus afforded municipalities is undercut
by the exemptions from this rule. For example, mandates approved in the legislature by a two-
thirds vote need not be funded. Id. Similarly, mandates coupled with a new local revenue source
are deemed funded and thus binding upon the localities. Id. When the constitutional rule does
apply, however, Florida municipalities apparently possess a right of prospective nullification. See
id.
Louisiana's constitution similarly provides that state-imposed mandates are not "effective
within a political subdivision.., until, and only as long as" such mandates are funded, language
that also appears to establish a right of prospective nullification. La. Const., Art. VI, § 14. How-
ever, as with Florida, the limited coverage of this rule deprives it of much practical significance.
For example, this provision does not apply to school-related mandates or to mandates affecting the
terms and conditions of employment of fire and municipal police personnel. Id. The Louisiana
Constitution's mandate provision also does not apply to mandates adopted by a two-thirds legisla-
tive vote. Id. In the remaining cases, however, the Louisiana Constitution apparently provides mu-
nicipalities a right of prospective nullification. See id.
Colorado's anti-mandate statute, on its face, provides municipalities the right of prospective
nullification, declaring unfunded mandates to "be optional on the part of the local government."
1991 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 29-1-304.5(1). However, just as legislatures can and have exempted them-
selves from statutory reimbursement requirements, the Colorado legislature can suspend this stat-
utory rule as to any mandate it selects. See id. at § 29-1-304.5(2).
120. An unfunded mandate might make some anti-service voters reconsider their position,
thus transforming a small, pre-mandate local majority against the service into a small, post-man-
date majority for the service.
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most of their substantive content since localities could decline to pro-
vide the required activities.
Under prospective nullification, unfunded mandates lose most of
their appeal to entrepreneurial legislators since such mandates offer lit-
tle profit to pro-service constitutencies. Unlike retrospective constitu-
tional reimbursement, which permits an opportunistic legislator to
satisfy pro-service groups currently relying on delay in the funding obli-
gation to postpone fiscal consequences, prospective reimbursement
forces legislators to supply full compensation to localities ab initio to
generate municipally provided services. Accordingly, legislators and the
constituencies previously supplied unfunded mandates would be forced,
from the beginning, to confront one another above the zone of discre-
tion, in full view of anti-service taxpayers. Their bargaining typically
will not come to political fruition since, had these interest groups pos-
sessed adequate support, they would not have accepted unfunded man-
dates in the first place. A legislature constrained by municipalities'
right of prospective nullification would adopt a mandate only when a
state-administered agency entails significant diseconomies of scale and
the decentralized provision of the service accordingly generates cost
savings."'
Under public interest assumptions, prospective nullification is an
unacceptably radical form of home rule which permits municipalities to
postpone for extended periods the implementation of desirable man-
dates and deters the legislature from imposing on localities appropriate
obligations to increase positive interjurisdictional spillovers and abate
negative externalities.
VI. OBSERVATIONS
For a number of reasons, the public choice model is, by a substan-
tial margin, the most compelling of the possible explanations of the un-
funded mandate phenomenon. The model is consistent with the
observable facts: the unfinanced obligations imposed by federal and
state law in practice correspond to the predictions of public choice the-
ory, bestowing concentrated benefits upon specific constituencies such
as government employees who profit from improved terms and condi-
tions of employment, recipients of redistributive largesse like welfare
payments and Medicaid services, and private school children who se-
cure publicly financed busing.12 2 Moreover, the constituencies obtaining
unfunded mandates in practice represent the kinds of groups that the
public choice model predicts will acquire mandates rather than more
121. See p. 1373.
122. As Pogo would understand, I have three such children.
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desirable forms of financing and administration. Municipal employees,
welfare recipients, and private school families are not particularly popu-
lar constituencies and cannot easily marshal majority support for their
demands. These groups are, however, self-conscious and frequently
well-organized, with sufficient political influence to procure the consola-
tion prize of the legislative process-the unfunded mandate-since the
resulting costs are hidden from legislators' anti-service constituents.
The relevance of public choice assumptions for unfunded mandates
is reinforced by the transformation of Congress and the state legisla-
tures from part-time bodies with significant party discipline into profes-
sionalized assemblages of full-time careerists with weak party loyalties,
an evolution which makes the public choice view of legislative behavior
even more compelling. 12  The contemporary legislator is an indepen-
dent, electoral operator who relies on his legislative seat as his main
source of income and professional identity and, accordingly, is more
likely to behave in the self-protective, entrepreneurial fashion predicted
by public choice theory than his old-style, party-based predecessor for
whom legislative service was an avocation rather than a primary career.
It is instructive that the rise of the "new" legislator parallelled the rise
of the new mandates; the latter is in large part a manifestation of the
former. As legislatures became increasingly comprised of full-time polit-
ical entrepreneurs, legislators increasingly behaved in the fashion indi-
cated by the public choice model, dispensing unfunded mandates to
accommodate interest groups and to advance their own political ambi-
123. The contemporary debate about term limitations largely centers on the normative sig-
nificance of the American legislator's transformation into a full-time political professional. Propo-
nents of term limits seek to restore the tradition of citizen-legislators; opponents of term limits
generally view more sanguinely the emergence of legislatures as full-time, professionalized bodies,
dismissing as misplaced sentimentalism the possibility or desirability of returning to earlier pat-
terns of legislative behavior. For purposes of this Article, it does not matter which side in the term
limit debate is normatively correct. The Article notes that both sides essentially agree on the char-
acter of contemporary legislatures as full-time, careerist institutions and that the individual serv-
ing in such an institution tends to act in the self-interested, entrepreneurial fashion predicted by
public choice theory. For a summary of the term limit debate by an advocate of such limits, see
generally George F. Will, Restoration: Congress, Term Limits, and the Recovery of Deliberative
Democracy (Macmillan, 1992). For discussion of the transformation of state legislatures into full-
time, careerist bodies, see generally Alan Ehrenhalt, The United States of Ambition (Random
House, 1991); Morris P. Fiorina, Divided Government in the American States: An Unintended
Consequence of Legislative Professionalism? (unpublished manuscript prepared for the 1993 an-
nual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, on file with Author). For a more posi-
tive view of contemporary legislatures, see Rivlin, Reviving the American Dream at 93, 106 (cited
in note 32) (criticizing old-style legislatures in which "[m]embers served part time, were paid little,
and were dependent on their primary jobs" in contrast to more professionalized, full-time bodies).
See also Arnold, The Logic of Congressional Action at 194 (cited in note 70) (characterizing the
contemporary Congress as "a careerist legislature filled with reelection-minded politicians").
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tions while hiding the resulting costs from their tax-conscious
constituents.
Also significant is the progressive maturation of suburban localities
from relatively homogeneous bedroom communities into more heteroge-
neous, urbanized jurisdictions. 24 The public choice model predicts that
suburban maturation breeds unfunded mandates; when there are more
numerous and more varied participants in local political processes,
there are consequently more losers who resort to higher levels of gov-
ernment and, hence, unfunded mandates to obtain what they cannot
win locally. 125 Again, the observable facts correspond to the theory, with
the rise of the new mandates parallelling the evolution of America's
suburbs into more variegated communities.
Finally, the public choice model is bolstered by considering alterna-
tive explanations for unfunded mandates, a process of elimination that
leaves public choice assumptions the most compelling interpretation of
such mandates. While the predilections of individual decisionmakers, as
well as the history, culture, and institutions of a particular state, can
influence the mandate phenomenon in that state, 126 the underlying phe-
nomenon is too systematic and too widespread to be explained merely
by local factors; fundamental forces must be at work across different
jurisdictions. One can similarly reject an ideological explanation for un-
funded mandates, laws which virtually no one defends in ideological
terms.
The best alternative to the public choice paradigm-the public in-
terest model-is, for two reasons, ultimately an unconvincing explana-
tion of unfunded mandates. First, the public interest model depends on
particularly heroic assumptions: that the mandated externalities re-
ceived by each jurisdiction exceed the jurisdiction's mandated costs and
that legislative behavior vis-a-vis unfunded mandates is public-regard-
ing in nature.127 Second, the availability of grants-in-aid and fully fi-
nanced mandates to affect lower tiers of government suggests that
legislators eschew these devices and enact unfunded mandates instead
to hide costs.
To continue an earlier example, 28 suppose that Central City's ex-
penses from mandated transportation infrastructure exceed the offset-
ting externalities City residents receive from mandated school programs
in the suburbs. In this (not unlikely) case, the network of state-imposed
obligations fails to maximize the well-being of Central City residents,
124. See generally David Rusk, Cities Without Suburbs (Johns Hopkins, 1993).
125. See notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
126. See discussion on pp. 1383-86.
127. See discussion in Part IV.
128. See the discussion following note 94.
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since they are paying more than they are receiving, and the public in-
terest defense of such unfinanced obligations accordingly fails. Equally
heroic is the supposition that mandate-enacting legislators are public-
regarding; one need not embrace the assumptions of public choice the-
ory in all respects and in all circumstances to conclude that the un-
funded mandate is principally a manifestation of legislative
opportunism.
Indeed, a legislature seeking to encourage a particular activity at
lower tiers of government can always induce the activity through
grants-in-aid. A legislature insisting on a specific activity at subordinate
levels of government also can adopt fully financed mandates to force
the localities to comply while compensating them completely for their
costs. To continue this example, the legislature could grant the City
assistance for expanded harbor infrastructure from the state's treasury
or could force the improvements it wants and pay for them from state
tax revenue. It thus appears that legislators prefer unfunded mandates
over grants-in-aid and fully financed mandates because these require
state financing and taxation whereas unfunded mandates do not. That
observation points back to the public choice model and its teaching that
legislators embrace unfinanced mandates to hide costs from their
constituents.
The public choice model explains a central episode of federal-state
relations in the post-World War II era: the demise of general revenue
sharing. Unrestricted revenue sharing, in Professor Aaron Wildavsky's
apt phrase "the entitlement that failed," '129 can be viewed as across-the-
board mandate reimbursement, a single bloc payment to states and lo-
calities in recompense for all the otherwise unfinanced obligations
Washington imposes upon them. Enacted originally by dint of Presi-
dent Nixon's ideological support, after he passed from the scene, the
only active supporters of general revenue sharing were state and local
officeholders, since no group's mandated service depended upon contin-
uation of revenue sharing. Bereft of allies in Congress and lacking presi-
dential protection, the governors and mayors themselves could not
prevent federal legislators from reclaiming revenue-sharing funds for
their own use. For members of the U.S. House and Senate, it was politi-
cally compelling to abolish revenue sharing since they left intact the
mandates that revenue sharing offset (and thus retained the support of
the constituencies receiving mandated services) while obtaining for
themselves valuable direct federal spending to dispense in return for
further support.




The public choice model cautions that most of the nostrums ad-
vanced by the anti-mandate school inadequately address the mandate
problem. While opponents of unfunded mandates treat them as remedi-
able through relatively minor fixes in the legislative process (improved
fiscal notes, supermajority rules, statutory reimbursement regimes),
public choice analysis suggests that, for the anti-mandate cause, the
only effective remedies are of a constitutional nature, eliminating the
legislative zone of discretion through judicially enforceable reimburse-
ment requirements. Lesser measures are ultimately premised on the
hope that the legislative adoption of mandates is public-regarding in
character,"' a hope which is excessively credulous; indeed, if legislative
conduct with respect to unfunded mandates is public-regarding in char-
acter, no mandate problem exists.
In designing a constitutional remedy, the public choice model sug-
gests that municipalities do not need protection from laws of general
applicability, but do require protection from legislatures that putatively
discharge mandated costs by empowering lower tiers of government to
raise taxes.'' Proposals targeted only at municipalities' leave them
isolated in the legislative process, bereft of allies to help reduce the leg-
islative zone of discretion. In contrast, when the legislature considers
proposals affecting municipalities in the same fashion as other persons
within the state, the localities have partners in the lawmaking process,
obviating the need for special care of municipal interests. 133 A legisla-
ture that imposes its regulation broadly is not "commandeering"'3 4 the
apparatus of municipal government to engage in hidden taxation since
the legislature, in such a case, openly inflicts costs as well on businesses,
households, or other entities.
When the legislature bestows upon localities the ability to tax to
offset mandated costs, the legislature, far from solving the mandate
problem, reveals the opportunistic nature of its actions. Rather than
levy the necessary taxes itself, the legislature in such situations seeks
130. See Part V.
131. See id.
132. Or, in the case of federal legislation, at states and localities.
133. The resulting borderline problems, distinguishing between laws of general applicability
and mandates subject to reimbursement, lie well within the competence of the judiciary. The most
difficult borderline case is legislation applying nominally to a broad class of entities but de facto
affecting only localities. For example, a state environmental regulation may, on its face, apply to
all providers of water but, in practice, impact only municipalities because all of the state's water
systems are municipally owned. These and similar situations should be resolved in favor of reim-
bursement because the legislature has the political incentive to skirt reimbursement whenever
possible.




the political benefits of accommodating mandate recipients while forc-
ing local officials to incur the costs of such accommodation.
These observations counsel, as a matter of federal constitutional
doctrine, resurrection in modified form of the Tenth Amendment re-
view of federal statutes affecting states and localities embraced in Na-
tional League of Cities v. Usery'35 and subsequently rejected in Garcia
v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.136 Under this revised
understanding of the Tenth Amendment, the Court would strike down
as unconstitutional unfunded mandates imposed federally on
subordinate units of government. For this purpose, mandates would be
defined as those unfinanced statutes and regulations burdening only
states and their local subdivisions.
In Usery, the Court narrowly held that the Constitution protects
the states from federal intrusion into the core functions of state govern-
ment.1 37 By an equally narrow margin, Garcia repudiated that ap-
proach, holding that the task of divining core government functions is
too problematic for the courts and that the interests of the states are
protected politically in Congress. 18s
The latter observation seems particularly naive from the vantage of
the public choice model, which suggests that, in the halls of Congress,
the constituencies seeking unfunded mandates are often better posi-
tioned to advance their political interests than the states and munici-
palities are to defend theirs.139 Moreover, the definition of mandate
proposed by this Article (unfinanced laws targeted only at states and
their subdivisions), while not without borderline problems, 4" generates
a more manageable inquiry for the courts than the elusive effort to
identify core government functions. The Tenth Amendment doctrine
proposed by this Article follows the Court's Carolene Products141 tradi-
tion, a tradition that extends judicial protection to persons structurally
incapable of protecting themselves politically.
Under this approach, the statute at issue in Garcia and Usery, the
Fair Labor Standards Act, 142 would pass Tenth Amendment muster
since the Act applies broadly to private as well as public employers. On
the other hand, under this Article's proposal, Congress could not consti-
135. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S.
528 (1985).
136. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
137. Usery, 426 U.S. at 851-52.
138. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 547-55.
139. See note 80 and accompanying text.
140. See notes 34-46 and accompanying text.
141. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53, n.4 (1938).
142. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988).
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tutionally impose narrowly targeted obligations on cities and states un-
less it fully reimbursed them for the costs.
New York v. United States14 suggests that the Court is moving in
this direction. In that decision, the Court invalidated on Tenth Amend-
ment grounds the "take title" provision of the Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985.1"" Under the "take title" provi-
sion, states failing federal standards for the disposal of low level radio-
active waste must assume ownership of such waste and all liabilities
attached to it. 145 Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice O'Connor in-
validated the take title arrangement in terms consistent with the public
choice model of unfunded mandates.146
Garcia and Usery, Justice O'Connor observed, are distinguishable
as instances "in which Congress has subjected a State to the same legis-
lation applicable to private parties, 147 a distinction consistent with the
argument that states and municipalities are less isolated politically, and
therefore less deserving of judicial assistance, when they have allies in
the effort to restrict legislative discretion. Moreover, legislation like the
take title provision, which applies only to states, allows federal deci-
sionmakers to make policy hidden from view, leaving state officials ex-
posed to the public's wrath:
[W]here the Federal Government compels States to regulate, the accountability of
both state and federal officials is diminished. If the citizens of New York, for exam-
ple, do not consider that making provision for the disposal of radioactive waste is in
their best interest, they may elect state officials who share their view. That view
can always be preempted under the Supremacy Clause if it is contrary to the na-
tional view, but in such a case it is the Federal Government that makes the deci-
sion in full view of the public, and it will be federal officials that suffer the
consequences if the decision turns out to be detrimental or unpopular. But where
the Federal Government directs the States to regulate, it may be state officials who
will bear the brunt of public disapproval, while the federal officials who devised the
regulatory program may remain insulated from the electoral ramifications of their
decision. Accountability is thus diminished when, due to federal coercion, elected
state officials cannot regulate in accordance with the views of the local electorate in
matters not pre-empted by federal regulation.
148
Given the substantial division of opinion in Garcia and Usery and
the import of New York v. United States, it probably will prove easier
to move the federal judiciary towards an anti-mandate Tenth Amend-
ment doctrine than to induce the states to adopt effective constitutional
143. 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992).
144. Id. at 2434 (referring to 42 U.S.C. § 2021b-j). The Court sustained the other provisions
of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985. New York, 112 S. Ct. at
2434.
145. 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(2)(c).
146. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2429.
147. Id. at 2420.
148. Id. at 2424.
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provisions proscribing unfunded mandates. The public choice model in-
dicates that legislatures, left to their own devices, will not willingly im-
pose bona fide constitutional restraints on their deal-making discretion,
any more than legislators who benefitted from malapportionment disin-
terestedly surrendered their political power by redistricting volunta-
rily.149 Legislatures can be convinced to enact fiscal note requirements,
supermajority rules, and statutory reimbursement regimes since in
practice these devices do little to constrain legislative discretion to dis-
pense unfunded mandates. Effective constitutional restraints on man-
dates are a different matter, a degree of self-discipline legislators are
unlikely to inflict upon themselves.
Even in states with popular initiation of constitutional amend-
ments, the public choice model gives scant cause for optimism. Pro-ser-
vice voters will oppose anti-mandate amendments to retain the largesse
they receive (or hope to receive), while, the model suggests, unsophisti-
cated anti-service voters will not know to favor such amendments.
150
Although anti-service voters might be educated by aggressive mayoral
campaigning' 5' or by external events that increase the saliency of un-
funded mandates, such as a statewide property tax revaluation, the in-
formational difficulties confronting anti-mandate forces should not be
underestimated. Indeed, these informational difficulties lie at the core
of the mandate problem.
1 5 2
This analysis suggests a search for state constitutional provisions,
similar to the Tenth Amendment, from which the courts can fashion
doctrines protecting municipalities from state-imposed unfunded man-
dates, a search particularly appropriate in this time of more general in-
terest in state constitutional law.1 53
149. The legislative reapportionment saga is, of course, well-known and does not require ex-
position here. See, for example, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210-237 (1962) (addressing a constitu-
tional challenge to the Tennessee Apportionment Act of 1901). This saga suggests that the
legislatures themselves cannot solve the mandate problem because legislators will not willingly
surrender their own political power.
150. See, for example, Linda J. Fontaine Fagan, Voters Reject "Proposition 1" School Fund-
ing Proposal, 4 State Tax Notes 1096, 1097 (1993) (reporting the defeat of an anti-mandate
amendment to the Texas Constitution).
151. For a description of the campaign waged by municipal officials in Florida for the adop-
tion of an anti-mandate amendment to the state constitution, see Larry Kelly, Talking Points for
Taking It to the People (Mar. 10, 1991); Avenel Associates, Post-Election Analysis of Amendment
#3 (Nov. 16, 1990).
152. See Table I1, p. 1376.
153. See generally Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism,
106 Harv. L. Rev. 1147 (1993); William J. Brennan, Jr., Foreword: Symposium on the Revolution
in State Constitutional Law, 13 Vt. L. Rev. 11 (1988); William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights
and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 535 (1986); Justice Hans A. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bill of
Rights, 9 U. Balt. L. Rev. 379 (1980).
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It would not seem difficult to find in a constitutional provision like
Michigan's anti-mandate amendment a municipal right of prospective
nullification which would enable localities to ignore mandates until
their claims for reimbursement have been ajudicated.15 4 In states with-
out such provisions, it seems possible, although more difficult,"'5 to in-
fer a right of. prospective nullification from traditional home rule
authorities adapting Justice O'Connor's reasoning from New York v.
United States to the relationship between states and their municipali-
ties. 15 The courts will find it most problematic to construct a right of
prospective nullification in states with limited anti-mandate amend-
ments in their state constitutions. In these jurisdictions,'57 the existence
of constitutional provisions specifically addressing the mandate prob-
lem in a limited fashion probably precludes the extension of traditional
home rule authority into expansive anti-mandate doctrines on the the-
ory that specific and recent measures pre-empt the application of older
and more general measures.
158
VII. CONCLUSION
Although critics of unfunded mandates generally treat them as re-
mediable glitches in the legislative process, correctable through rela-
tively minor reforms like better information, supermajority
iequirements, and statutory reimbursement regimes, unfinanced man-
dates arise from deeper causes and necessitate more fundamental reme-
dies. Unfunded mandates are best understood in public choice terms, as
a form of hidden taxation through which poorly monitored policymak-
ers use their discretion to accommodate pro-service groups without al-
erting their anti-service constituents to the deals these constituents are
financing. Decisionmakers do not adopt unfunded mandates because
they are ill-informed but, rather, because such mandates allow deci-
sionmakers to satisfy interest groups seeking public largesse without re-
vealing to anti-service voters the resulting costs these voters bear. The
154. For a judicial interpretation of the anti-mandate provision of the Michigan Constitu-
tion, see Schmidt v. Dep't of Educ., 441 Mich. 236, 490 N.W.2d 584 (1992).
155. See, for example, City of New Orleans v. State of Louisiana, 426 S.2d 1318 (La. 1983),
in which the Louisiana Supreme Court refused to construe the state constitutional home rule pro-
vision as affording localities protection from unfunded mandates: "The autonomy of local govern-
mental subdivisions with home rule charters is limited by general legislation enacted under the
State's police power." Id. at 1321.
156. See notes 143-48 and accompanying text.
157. See, for example, notes 42, 43, and 58 for a discussion of the Florida and Louisiana anti-
mandate amendments.
158. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, Gulotta v.
State of New York, No. 93006067 (N.Y. June 30, 1993) (contending that the system of state-im-
posed unfunded mandates violates, inter alia, provisions of the New York state constitution).
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groups obtaining unfunded mandates are likely to overcome
supermajority and reimbursement rules placed in their paths. As a
problem of constitutional dimension, unfunded mandates and the hid-
den taxation they entail can only be eliminated by constitutional
reform.

